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This article explores a crucial moment in American legal history, known as the Lochner 
era, in which the rise of freedom of contract was sharp enough to defeat equity concerns, 
and then argues that a second rise of the freedom of contract has recently been developed 
by the Supreme Court in the domain of arbitration agreements. It contends that this 
second rise is not only a revival of Lochnerism but also, and more so, what the article 
names “neoliberal-Lochnerism”: a process of legal dissemination of neoliberal common 
sense outside of the world of contracts. Via close reading of leading recent cases, the 
article demonstrates that the genus of arbitration agreements now allowed by the US 
Supreme Court represents an assault on fairness, morality, and justice that is larger 
than the eye can see at first glance. The result, it is argued, is “law without equity”, a 
form of neoliberal jurisprudence that allows, and even incentivizes, humans who have 
accumulated enough power to act opportunistically. Without equity’s restraining power, 
the article concludes, those possessing a combination of economic means, political influence, 
and intellectual sophistication can and will exploit the legal rules to undermine justice.
* The title of this article responds to Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of 
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I. Introduction
That a true freedom of contract necessitates legal enforcement of agreements by courts is an accepted premise from time immemorial. 
Throughout the years, and until today,1 numerous American cases have 
quoted a famous English case from 1875 that stated the idea as follows:
if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that 
men … shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by Courts of justice.2
1. See e.g. the 1900 case of Baltimore & OSR Co v Voigt, 176 US 498 (1900) 
at 505-506; and the 2015 case of Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, 
LLP v Lopez, 467 SW (3d) 494 (Tex Sup Ct 2015).
2. Printing & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875), 19 LR Eq 462 at 
465 (CA (Eng)).
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Although few would argue against the general presumption that the 
freedom of contract requires an enforceability of contracts, there has also 
been a much larger ongoing debate regarding the limits of this idea. Do 
courts always have an obligation, or a duty, to enforce contracts, or are 
they allowed to refuse enforcement under some circumstances? With 
regard to this question numerous American cases have quoted another old 
and famous English case, authored in 1751 in the “courts of conscience” 
— England’s courts of equity.3 In this case, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
explained that the courts of conscience would not enforce agreements 
that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the 
one hand, and … no honest and fair man would accept on the other”.4
Moreover, he also described those undeserving agreements by 
directly referring to equity and conscience, naming them “unequitable 
and unconscientious bargains”.5 And, although it was not the first time 
that courts had refused enforcement of unfair contracts,6 it was certainly 
one of the first times the refusal was theorized in conscience-oriented 
terms and reflected the logic of equity. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s 
words established the unconscionability principle as an equity-based 
limit on the freedom of contract and his words have proven appealing 
to generations of judges and legal commentators on both sides of the 
3. See e.g. Dennis R Klinck, “The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience” 
(2005) 31:1 Queen’s Law Journal 206 at 208 [Klinck, “Nebulous”] 
citing Ewing v Orr (1883), 9 App Cas 34 (HL)(in which the court said 
“[t]he courts of equity in England are, and always have been, courts 
of conscience” at 40); see also Klinck, “Nebulous” (stating that “no 
doubt historically conscience and equity were intimately allied, even 
synonymous” at 211).
4. Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751), 28 ER 82 at 100 (Ch) [Earl of 
Chesterfield].
5. Ibid [emphasis added].
6. For the “ancient roots” of unconscionability, see e.g. Stephen E Friedman, 
“Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for 
Contractual Overreaching” (2010) 44:2 Georgia Law Review 317 at 334-
43 (citing sources which connect the idea to ancient Jewish and Roman 
law). 
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pond.7 Notably, Hardwicke LC’s words have also proven influential in all 
courts, regardless of the traditional separation between courts of equity 
and courts of law.8
The conflict between the freedom of contract and the 
unconscionability principle — with the former construed as demanding 
courts to enforce contracts and the latter understood as ordering courts to 
refuse enforcement — has yielded an ongoing and intense jurisprudential 
debate, depicted by a number of scholars.9 However, for the most part 
American courts have managed to strike some sort of balance by routinely 
enforcing contracts while occasionally utilizing unconscionability and 
other equity-based principles to deny enforcement. And, although the 
pendulum has shifted from time to time,10 by and large there has been no 
definite loser or winner.
An exception emerged, however, during a defined period in 
American jurisprudence known today as the Lochner era.11 During this 
7. The first American case to refer to the words of Hardwicke LC in Earl of 
Chesterfield, supra note 4 is Powell v Spaulding, 3 Greene 443 (Iowa Sup 
Ct 1852) [Powell]. The Supreme Court has adopted the full definition in 
Hume v United States, 132 US 406 (1889) [Hume]. To date, the latest case 
citing the definition in full (including the archaic term “unconscientious 
bargains” as opposed to only referring to Earl of Chesterfield, supra note 
4 is Brown v Genesis Healthcare Corp, 228 W Va 646 (Sup Ct App 2011 
(US)) at 67-80 [Brown], vacated, Marmet Health Care Center, Inc v Brown, 
132 S Ct 1201 (2012 (US)) [Marmet].
8. See the decision of the US Supreme court in Hume, supra note 7 (citing 
Hardwicke LC’s definition, and other cases that had followed it, and 
affirming the lower court’s finding that “[t]hese citations are sufficient to 
show that in suits upon unconscionable agreements the courts of law will 
take the matter in their own control, and will, without the intervention 
of courts of equity, protect the parties against their enforcement” at 406, 
411). 
9. See e.g. Carolyn Edwards, “Freedom of Contract and Fundamental 
Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues” (2009) 77:3 
University of Missouri Kansas City Law Review 647.
10. Charles L Knapp, “Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel” 
(1998) 49:5&6 Hastings Law Journal 1191 at 1202.
11. The era got its name from the infamous case of Lochner v New York, 198 
US 45 (1905) [Lochner].
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era, the Supreme Court created a new jurisprudence, giving the freedom 
of contract a constitutional status strong enough to command the 
enforcement of contracts even in the face of state legislation specifically 
designed to invalidate them. This article explores this crucial moment 
in history, in which the rise of freedom of contract was sharp enough to 
defeat equity concerns, and then argues that a second rise of the freedom 
of contract has recently been developed by the Supreme Court in the 
domain of arbitration agreements. 
Much like in the Lochner era, this rise involves an emergence of a 
new jurisprudence, and in this case, one that entails an original form of 
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act12 (“FAA”). First in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v Concepcion13 (“AT&T”), and then in American Express 
v Italian Colors Restaurant14 (“American Express”), the Court decided 
to reverse decisions of the lower courts that refused to enforce class 
arbitration waivers. In both situations, the lower courts had refused to 
enforce the waivers because enforcing them would deny the waiving 
parties — consumers in AT&T and a small restaurant in American Express 
— any access to justice. However, as the Supreme Court explained, each 
of the lower courts — California’s Supreme Court in AT&T and the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American Express — erred 
because, according to the new reading of the FAA, the freedom of contract 
is not limited by fairness or morality concerns in the arbitration context. 
Rather, “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements”,15 even 
if the drafting parties deliberately have used their superior bargaining 
power not to design a private forum of litigation, but as a way to avoid 
litigation, thereby circumventing their legal liability and leaving future 
claimers with no legal recourse. 
What makes this approach comparable to the one developed in 
the Lochner era is that the Court, once again, has taken the freedom of 
contract to a new level, making it a concept that has the power to de-
authorize and delegitimize state actors as they make efforts to prevent 
12. 9 USC §2 (1947) [FAA]. 
13. 131 S Ct 1740 (2011 (US)) [AT&T].
14. 133 S Ct 2304 (2013 (US)) [American Express].
15. Ibid at 2309 [emphasis added].
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injustice. Surely, AT&T and American Express were not the first in 
which the Supreme Court reversed decisions that invalidated arbitration 
agreements. However, until recently such reversals were explained by 
the Court’s belief that the terms were not as inequitable as the lower 
court had seen them. And here lies the “revolution”:16 under the new 
jurisprudence, arbitration agreements should be enforced even if they 
are inequitable. Put another way, never before were courts categorically 
forbidden from using equity principles to overcome extreme injustice 
caused by an opportunistic and manipulative use of the law. And, the 
change is especially remarkable given the fact that the ability to utilize 
equity tools in the context of arbitration is explicitly guaranteed under 
the FAA itself; in its relevant section the FAA clarifies that an arbitration 
agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”.17
While the parallels between the Lochner era and the new arbitration 
jurisprudence are prominent,18 the current “neo-Lochnerism”19 is more 
than a revival of an old belief for a few reasons. First, because applying 
Lochnerian ideas to our times exponentially magnifies their effect mainly 
due to the incalculable amount and variety of mass contracts that impose 
arbitration across the entire market. Secondly, despite the similarities, 
there is something thoroughly different about the new rise of the freedom 
of contract. This time around, I argue, we face a “neoliberal-Lochnerism”, 
and this neoliberal version means, to quote political scientist Wendy 
16. J Maria Glover, “Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive 
Law” (2015) 124:8 Yale Law Journal 3052 [Glover, “Disappearing 
Claims”] (describing the Supreme Court’s new arbitration as a revolution). 
17. FAA, supra note 12 [emphasis added].
18. I am not the only one to point to this similarity. See e.g. Burt Neuborne, 
“Ending Lochner Lite” (2015) 50:1 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 183. However, my focus is on the difference between the 
original Lochnerism and its contemporary version. 
19. For the use of this term in a different context (relating to the Supreme 
Court’s new First Amendment jurisprudence that generally speaking 
assigned corporations the rights formerly reserved to humans), see 
Jedediah Purdy, “Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New 
Economy” (2014) 77:4 Law & Contemporary Problems 195.
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Brown, that “more is at stake … than support for capital in the name 
of freedom”.20 This article suggests that what we are witnessing is no less 
than a very troubling phase in the neoliberal project — one that uses the 
power of law to thwart equity principles, denies the logic of equity, and 
will eventually eradicate the notion of justice.
Beyond the actual outcome of particular cases, neoliberal-Lochnerism 
is produced by the emergence of an original legal discourse that operates 
to transform the meaning of everything. Offering a close reading of the 
rhetoric used by Justice Scalia in both AT&T and American Express, 
this article demonstrates how the new arbitration jurisprudence works 
to disseminate neoliberal rationality, in at least three major ways. First, 
Scalia J’s analysis translates every idea to “Economish” — the language of 
economy — and reframes the issue to fit “the logic of profit-making”.21 
For example, unlike public litigation, private arbitrations are presented 
as offering “greater efficiency”,22 by “reducing the cost and increasing the 
speed of dispute resolution”.23 Second, the logic of speed and efficiency 
is used to conduct an assault on a collective agency of legal subjects. 
For instance, Scalia J asserts that allowing class arbitrations is “likely to 
generate procedural morass”,24 and therefore only individual arbitration 
is rational. Such a “divide and conquer” tactic not only isolates weaker 
subjects, it also assigns to them the sole responsibility for their poor fate. 
And third, this neoliberal reasoning is capable of gaining broad popularity 
outside the elite because it is presented as universal, while the fact that 
it is biased and reflects only the viewpoints of the most powerful market 
actors is carefully disguised. All in all, the new rationality takes over not 
only the economy but also the justice system, which it leaves devoid of 
20. Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New 
York & Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books & MIT Press, 2015) at 153.
21. Eric J Weiner, Private Learning, Public Needs: The Neoliberal Assault on 
Democratic Education (New York: Peter Lang, 2005) at 20 citing Henry A 
Giroux, “Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of Higher 
Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere” (2002) 72:4 
Harvard Educational Review 425.
22. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1751.
23. Ibid at 1749.
24. Ibid at 1751.
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equity logic. 
Before proceeding, an explanation is warranted for my use of the 
term equity and my recurrent references to equity principles, equity 
discourse, and the logic of equity. For the purposes of this article, “equity” 
is deliberately used in a non-technical and non-formalistic fashion. To be 
sure, as an old concept that survived centuries of use by different humans 
in a variety of countries and cultures, equity cannot possibly have a simple 
meaning. And yet, I believe that a modern working definition is essential 
in order to capture the problem at hand. I also believe that the old idea 
of equity would not have endured unless the specific doctrines developed 
under this broad title shared a core logic and together brought to modern 
law a unique focus that goes beyond the particulars. 
To conceptualize such a general message, I start from adopting 
Dennis Klinck’s view that “[o]ne cannot delve very far into judicial 
equity without encountering the notion of ‘conscience’”;25 combined 
with Irit Samet’s argument that conscience offers equity “a workable 
legal standard”.26 I continue with an observation made by the former 
Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, who wrote that “equity 
came to reflect a strong sense of morality”, and “equitable principles were 
shaped with a view to inhibiting unconscientious conduct and providing 
for relief against it”.27 Additionally, I draw on two recent works done at 
the intersection of equity and private law by an American legal scholar, 
Henry Smith,28 and a Canadian philosophy scholar, Dennis Klimchuk.29 
Both have attributed to equity the role of inhibiting opportunists from 
25. Dennis R Klinck, Conscience, Equity, and the Court of Chancery in 
Early Modern England (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 2010) at vii [Klinck, 
Conscience].
26. Irit Samet, “What Conscience Can do for Equity” (2012) 3:1 Jurisprudence 
13 at 20.
27. Sir Anthony Mason, “Equity’s Role in the Twentieth Century” (1997-
98) 8 Kings College Law Journal 1 at 1. 
28. Henry E Smith, “Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law” in Lisa M Austin 
& Dennis Klimchuk, eds, Private Law and the Rule of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) at 224 [Austin & Klimchuk, Private Law].
29. Dennis Klimchuk, “Equity and the Rule of Law” in Austin & Klimchuk, 
Private Law, supra note 28 at 247 [Klimchuk, “Equity”].
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exploiting the generality, formality, and strictness of the law. Thus, all in 
all, I use the idea of equity as an insistence that judicial discretion should 
be applied with conscience in mind, and that the legal outcome must 
deter exploitation of the law while promoting fairness, moral behavior, 
and social justice.30
This article unfolds in three parts. Part II tells the story of the first 
rise of the freedom of contract during the Lochner era. Part III argues 
and demonstrates that a second rise of the freedom of contract is taking 
place in recent years. It also contends that this second rise is not only a 
revival of Lochnerism but further reflects a process of legal dissemination 
of neoliberal rationality. Part IV explains why and how such neoliberal 
rationality works to defeat principles of equity, and cautions that “law 
without equity” severely undermines the quest for justice. The article 
concludes in a somewhat more hopeful tone, emphasizing the power of 
equity to counter neoliberal rationality and to offer a better narrative of 
justice.
II. The First Rise of Freedom of Contract
The jurisprudence developed by American courts during the “Lochner 
era” had made the limitation of state powers the essence of the freedom of 
contract. Within a few decades, between the end of the 19th century and 
the first quarter of the 20th century,31 the freedoms held by market actors 
were not only articulated as a chief liberty, but more importantly, were 
instilled with new meaning. In 1909, only four years after the Lochner 
decision, Roscoe Pound stated that “liberty of contract” was a new term 
in an article he authored, titled “The Liberty of Contract”.32 In it, Pound 
30. For a longer discussion of this role of the judiciary as applied to market 
behaviors see Hila Keren, “Guilt-Free Markets? Unconscionability, 
Conscience, and Emotions” (Forthcoming, 2016) Brigham Young 
University Law Review [Keren, “Guilt-Free Markets”]. 
31. See e.g. Morgan Cloud, “The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner 
Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory” (1996) 48:3 
Stanford Law Review 555 (presenting different periods covered by the 
term).
32. Roscoe Pound, “The Liberty of Contract” (1909) 18:7 Yale Law Journal 
454.
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embarked on a description of the rise of freedom of contract and the 
meaning attached to the term. The result is an authentic portrayal of 
the inception of an idea that controls our life until today, without the 
problems attached to hindsight wisdom. 
As Pound explained, the term “liberty of contract” itself was new 
then and was not used by courts as a legal constraint on governments’ 
powers prior to 1886. The novelty of the American courts of the period 
was less in recognizing the freedom of choice available to individuals 
dealing with one another within the market, and more in using this 
freedom, or liberty, as a constitutional principle. Case after case, the newly 
constitutionalized “liberty of contract” was used to invalidate state efforts 
to protect weaker market players, mainly workers, via regulation of the 
market. With a critical tone, Pound described how, by elevating the 
freedom of contract to the level of a constitutional principle, the courts 
have deemed unconstitutional regulations that limited labor hours of 
women33 and workers of bakeries,34 required employers to pay wages in 
money rather than with credit to the employer’s store,35 determined how 
coal should be weighed for purposes of compensating miners,36 and so 
on. As Pound generalized: “[i]n this way [freedom of contract] became a 
chief article in the creed of those who sought to minimize the functions 
of the state”.37
But what about certain individuals who may be pressured into 
agreeing to harmful contracts? Shouldn’t the state protect them? The 
answer emerging in the Lochner era was bluntly negative. Attempts to 
argue that some individuals or groups of individuals — such as industrial 
workers or women — are more vulnerable and need special protection 
by the state failed. The reasoning, which Pound himself criticized at 
length as “academic”38 and hence false, is worth our attention. Freedom 
33. Ibid at 475, citing Ritchie v People, 155 Ill 98 (Sup Ct 1895).
34. Ibid at 479, citing Lochner, supra note 11.
35. Ibid at 472, citing State v Goodwill, 33 W Va 179 (Sup Ct App 1889); 
and citing Frorer v People, 141 Ill 171 (Sup Ct 1892) at 473 [Frorer].
36. Ibid at 471, citing Jones v People, 110 Ill 590 (Sup Ct 1884).
37. Ibid at 456.
38. Ibid at 487.
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of contract, courts of the period insisted, is a natural liberty that, as such, 
applies equally to all. The employer and the employee, for example, 
were regarded as having equal rights in designing their contract, which 
included a determination of the amount of working hours. And, since 
“the employer and the employee have equality of right”, as one court 
famously stated, “any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary 
interference with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally 
justify in a free land”.39
Courts further insisted that to decide otherwise — that is, to affirm 
protective legislation that invalidates certain contractual provisions 
— would mean not to protect, but rather, to mistreat and harm the 
seemingly protected parties. This is because according to this Lochnerian 
approach, only inferior people lack the full capacity — or liberty, or 
freedom — to contract. Thus, for example, preventing an employee 
from selling his ability to work for long hours, would mean to degrade 
and insult him, or to treat him like a fool.40 Similarly, invalidating a 
statute requiring wages to be paid solely in money the Supreme Court 
of Kansas reasoned, “places the laborer under guardianship, classifying 
him in respect of freedom of contract with the idiot, the lunatic, or the 
felon in the penitentiary”.41 What even Pound could see in the midst of 
the Lochner era and without the perspective of time was how hypocritical 
and unrealistic the hypothesis of equality between stronger and weaker 
market players was. The problem, of course, was that the equality logic 
and the presumption that weaker parties enjoy the same freedom of 
contract as their counterparts was used against these vulnerable parties to 
deprive them of state assistance or state protection. 
This harmful effect is not surprising given the fact that insistence by 
the courts on the idea that miners, bakers, and women equally enjoy the 
same freedom of contract as their powerful employers never originated 
from a concern for the dignity of the less powerful individuals. Rather, the 
true motivation was an antiregulatory approach, aimed at delegitimizing 
any form of state intervention in the market, with special hostility to acts 
39. Ibid at 454, citing Adair v United States, 208 US 161 (1908) at 175.
40. Ibid at 463.
41. Ibid at 477, citing State v Haun, 61 Kan 146 (Sup Ct 1899) [Haun].
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of legislation. The concept of a universal and natural liberty of contract 
and the persistence that such a liberty exists for all were merely tools 
used to that end. Or, as Pound remarked upon the new jurisprudence 
of his time: “the idea of liberty of contract has been invoked to defeat 
legislation”.42
However, the very use of the contractual idea in order to defeat 
the state has transformed the meaning of the idea itself. What once 
mainly stood for a celebration of individualism and private ordering has 
now begun to chiefly symbolize a paralyzed state lacking the power to 
take care of its own citizens or to promote public interests. As Pound 
himself warned back in 1909, the rhetoric of equal freedoms is not only 
“artificial”,43 but also quite dangerous: it has the potential to “defeat the 
very end of liberty”.44 When courts insist that the state cannot and should 
not interfere if vulnerable parties are exploited by contracts the result for 
those parties is less freedom. 
Looking at things from a contemporary perspective, it is important 
to realize that the liberty of contract jurisprudence that had developed 
in Pound’s days significantly deviated from the law of contracts of the 
period. To be sure, the common law often called for the enforcement 
of promises regardless of gaps in bargaining power between the parties 
and without much concern for fairness. However, principles developed 
in equity were part of the law as well, offering legitimate legal ways to 
protect vulnerable parties from unfair contracts. As Pound reminds us: 
“[f ]rom the time that promises not under seal have been enforced at all, 
equity has interfered with contracts in the interests of weak, necessitous, 
or unfortunate promisors”.45 For example, equity courts have for a long 
time released sailors from promises to dispose of their wages “where they 
appeared unfair, one-sided, or inequitable”; and similarly ignored waivers 
of necessitous borrowers of their right for redemption.46 And, despite the 
ongoing use of such equity-based protections, and prior to the emergence 
42. Ibid at 470.
43. Ibid at 487.
44. Ibid at 484.
45. Ibid at 482.
46. Ibid at 482-83.
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of the Lochnerian logic, there was no assertion that their use degraded the 
protected parties or classified them with “the idiots, lunatics, or felons”.47 
Rather, these protections symbolized a concern for justice, arising from 
a realistic understanding that not all humans enjoy the same kind of 
freedom of contract.
Apparently, judges committed to the newly developed jurisprudence 
of liberty of contract were fully aware of this state of the law, which 
via principles of equity took into account gaps in the availability of the 
freedom of contract for individuals in differing socio-economic classes. 
In Frorer v People48 (“Frorer”) for example, the court reviewed legislation 
requiring that employees be paid monetary wages rather than with credit 
to their employer’s store. In this context the judge explicitly discussed 
gaps of power between borrowers and lenders, explaining that “the 
borrower’s necessities deprive him of freedom in contracting and place 
him at the mercy of the lender”.49 The Frorer court further explained 
that such inequality is the reason that “all civilized nations of the world, 
both ancient and modern” have some version of usury laws.50 However, 
as Pound noted, it did not occur to the judge that the same logic was 
relevant to the miners and workers protected by the legislation under 
his review, that they too suffered from unequal freedom of contract, and 
that their inequality called for affirmation rather than invalidation of 
the reviewed protective legislation. Instead, and in the spirit of the new 
liberty of contract jurisprudence, the Frorer court decided that since all 
are equal in their freedom to contract no legislation can legitimately limit 
the ability of workers to “consent” to non-monetary wages.
The insistence of courts during the Lochner era that the freedom 
of contract is equally available to all members of society soon attracted 
criticism. Pound himself argued that such equality exists only in 
theory and blamed the courts of his time for their “academic” view of 
47. Ibid at 477 (referring to the reasoning of Haun, supra note 41).
48. Ibid at 473, citing Frorer, supra note 35.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
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individualism that, he argued, has no factual basis.51 Part of the damage 
of such an unrealistic approach, cautioned Pound, was a growing 
feeling of bias. Quoting “an acute and well-informed observer”, Pound 
reported “a growing distrust of the integrity of the courts”, coming from 
a “belief that the present judge has been a corporation attorney, that his 
sympathies and experience and his whole view of life is on the corporation 
side”.52 The contemporary version of this salient bias argument will be 
further developed later.53 For now, however, it is worth to note that the 
contention that letting freedom of contract take over equity principles 
risks the integrity of the law was expressed as early as in the midst of the 
Lochner era. 
Much as Pound predicted in a hopeful tone, the Lochner era 
eventually came to an end. Specifically, the Supreme Court reversed its 
Lochner decision in 1937,54 and more generally, protective legislation 
was no longer systematically deemed unconstitutional. However, as 
professor Robin West recently argued, the concept of freedom of contract 
as it was formed in the Lochner era — as “a natural right to determine 
whether, with whom, and on what terms we will take on other-regarding 
obligations, that in turn determines a sphere of freedom into which 
the state may not intrude” — remained alive.55 As we shall now see 
our contemporary understanding of the idea of freedom of contract, to 
quote West, “is still strikingly Lochnerian in its content — we just do not 
think the Constitution protects it any longer”.56 However, in the coming 
section I go beyond West’s argument to caution that our current version 
of Lochner has further transformed the original concept of freedom of 
contract, elevating its status and deepening its reach in a manner that 
51. For a similar contemporary argument see David Strauss, “Why Was 
Lochner Wrong?” (2003) 70:1 University of Chicago Law Review 373 at 
383-86.
52. Pound, supra note 32 at 487.
53. See Part IV, below.
54. Robin L West, “The Right to Contract as a Civil Right” (2014) 26:4 Saint 
Thomas Law Review 551 at 558 [West, “The Right to Contract”], citing 
West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937) at 391. 
55. West, “The Right to Contract”, ibid at 558.
56. Ibid.
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presents a new level of threat to equity principles. 
III. The Second Rise of Freedom of Contract
A. The New Arbitration Jurisprudence
For several decades it seemed as if the freedom of contract was on the fall. 
For a while, and with a dip in the period known in American history as the 
New Deal, legislators and judges had shown an increased willingness to 
limit the freedom of contract in order to promote public goals and social 
justice. For example, new antidiscrimination laws limited the freedom 
in selecting contractual partners, emphasizing that certain categories, 
such as gender or race, could no longer be a legitimate basis for rejecting 
a potential partner. Notably, courts had used their equity powers, and 
especially the unconscionability principle, to invalidate unfair contracts 
and to release parties with inferior bargaining power from predatory 
obligations.57
During this post-Lochner era it seemed as if the old rivalry between 
the state and the market had been settled; the state was no longer required 
to leave the market alone (“laissez-faire”); and some political supervision 
of the economy was appropriate. While the freedom of contract still 
functioned as a symbol of autonomy, agency, and choice, and as imposing 
on courts an almost absolute duty to enforce contracts, it seemed to have 
lost its Lochnerian face that had previously debilitated the state and its 
legal powers and as imposing on courts an almost-absolute duty to enforce 
contracts. The Supreme Court’s special liberty of contract jurisprudence 
— as described by Pound — was put to rest, and instead the Court’s 
constitutional attention, especially under the leadership of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, turned away from the protection of the market and towards 
matters more associated with modern democracy and its operation. 
However, at some point during the 1970s, things began to change, 
57. See e.g. Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co, 350 F (2d) 445 (DC Cir 
1965). 
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creating what many refer to today as our “neoliberal” age.58 In addition 
to deregulation, privatization, and a general revival of the conflict 
between market and state, the neoliberal decades have brought back 
the Lochnerian understanding of freedom of contract. In this second 
rise of the freedom of contract, the idea has re-gained its meaning as a 
legal and political restraint on the state and its legal powers. And again, 
similar to the Lochner era, the renewed high status of the freedom of 
contract has resulted from the emergence of a new jurisprudence that 
has been developed by the Supreme Court: in this case, a new arbitration 
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court’s new arbitration jurisprudence, recently referred 
to as the arbitration “revolution”,59 is an original form of interpretation 
of the FAA established by the Supreme Court in recent years. Unlike the 
Lochner era, the Court’s new jurisprudence is aimed not at legislators but 
at the work of judges in lower courts who have used equity principles, and 
mainly the doctrine of unconscionability, to avoid enforcement of what 
they have perceived as unfair arbitration agreements. What is exceptional 
about this approach is that — parallel to the Lochner era — the Supreme 
Court has taken the freedom of contract to a new level, making it a 
concept that has the power to de-authorize and delegitimize state actors 
as they make efforts to prevent injustice. 
At the beginning, long before this revolution, the FAA was an act of 
legitimization. Its enactment in 1925 was interpreted as establishing the 
once-doubted freedom of contractual parties to agree on private dispute 
resolution outside of the public legal system. At that period, enforcement 
of arbitration agreements was only a way to publicly support the freedom 
of contract of parties with similar bargaining power(s) who chose to 
negotiate and conclude an agreement to arbitrate their future disputes. 
58. See e.g. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, “Introduction: Law 
and Neoliberalism” (2014) 77:4 Law & Contemporary Problems 1. 
Defining “neoliberalism” is a hard task that is beyond the scope of this 
work. However, the discussion that follows explains some of the main 
features of neoliberalism. See generally, David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 206.
59. Glover, “Disappearing Claims”, supra note 16.
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In those times, most corporations and big businesses did not use this 
freedom in their relationships with their customers, workers, franchisees, 
or other weaker parties.60 Indeed, in 1953, the Supreme Court indicated 
that enforceability is limited to transactions made at arm’s length 
as opposed to situations in which the plaintiff “had no choice but to 
accept the arbitration stipulation, thereby making the stipulation an 
unconscionable and unenforceable provision in a business transaction”.61
Next came privatization. In 1983, time that importantly accords with 
the inception of the neoliberal age, the Supreme Court announced that 
the FAA reflects “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” 
and therefore “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should 
be resolved in favor of arbitration”.62 In the years that followed, the Court 
consistently applied its pro-arbitration policy, expanding the FAA’s 
reach far beyond enforcing agreements between businesses with similar 
powers. Most importantly, the Court affirmed, and by that encouraged, 
an increasing use of arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion drafted 
by legal teams working at the service of big corporations. Those form 
contracts compelled millions of weaker parties — consumers, workers, 
clients, patients, franchisees, and other would-be-claimants — to forgo 
public litigation and instead commit to resolving disputes in arbitration.63 
To enhance the transference of disputes from the public to the private 
system, many restrictions on the types of claims considered arbitrable 
were removed, giving drafters of form contracts the leeway to subject to 
arbitration a variety of statutory rights which never before were discussed 
in arbitration, including those protected under antidiscrimination laws. 
As in any other act of privatization, the shift from public to private 
legal services was followed by a transformation of the service itself. 
60. J Maria Glover, “Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements” (2006) 59:5 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1735 at 1740 [Glover, “Beyond Unconscionability”]. 
61. Wilko v Swan, 346 US 427 (1953) at 440.
62. Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1 
(1983) at 24-25. 
63. David Horton, “The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments” (2010) 57:3 UCLA Law Review 605 at 621-22.
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Using their excessive power and their control of the drafting process, 
corporations not only insisted on transferring litigation to a private 
forum, but also invested resources in changing the rules governing the 
private process and its results. Form contracts were used, for example, to 
limit discovery rights, shorten limitation periods, and eliminate specific 
remedies.64
The judicially supported privatization of dispute resolution services 
combined with the ability to modify the rules of private litigation in a 
way that would better serve the interests of the drafters of the arbitration 
agreements certainly sacrificed the interests of their weaker counterparts. 
And yet, before the most recent change of jurisprudence, this sacrifice 
was still somewhat cabined mainly by the idea of unconscionability. The 
Court’s pro-arbitration approach prior to the revolution was explained 
by the virtues that the Court attributed to the mechanism of arbitration. 
Time and again, courts emphasized that their willingness to enforce 
the arbitration agreement is based on their belief, or assumption, 
that arbitration agreements benefit both parties by offering them an 
effective path of dispute resolution. Following this logic courts refused 
enforcement when the agreement dictated an arbitration that was clearly 
designed to harm one of the parties. Accordingly, courts used the doctrine 
of unconscionability to invalidate, for example, an arbitration agreement 
that was designed to make the arbitration process prohibitively expensive 
for purchasers of computers.65
The most significant change brought by this court-approved 
privatization was the imposition of class action waivers. Those waivers 
— which quickly became part of every standard arbitration agreement — 
work to ensure that weaker parties remain isolated from each other and 
forego the ability to join others similarly harmed by a corporation.66 As 
we shall soon see, it is this change that eventually gave rise to the Supreme 
64. Glover, “Beyond Unconscionability”, supra note 60 at 1742.
65. See e.g. Brower v Gateway 2000, Inc, 676 NYS (2d) 569 (App Div 1998)
(invalidating a term requiring arbitration due to a minimum up-front 
fee of $4,000 and explaining that such fee would “deter consumers from 
invoking arbitration” at 573).
66. Horton, supra note 63 at 631-32.
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Court’s new arbitration jurisprudence. Instead of merely turning a public 
process into a private one, those waivers have a special potential to harm 
weaker parties by effectively preventing them from the pursuit of their 
rights, even in a limited private forum. This effect is especially relevant 
within the context of claims that have a relatively small monetary value 
due to the cost of litigation far exceeding the potential reward. In those 
cases, enforcement of the arbitration agreement does not lead to private 
litigation but rather to the prevention of any litigation, vanquishing 
any legal right(s) the weaker party may have against the stronger party. 
This potential of class arbitration waivers to minimize or even eliminate 
litigation did not escape the awareness of drafters of form contracts, and 
the waivers became a widespread strategy used by big businesses in their 
contracts with consumers, employees, and other weaker parties. In this 
age of privatization, many courts enforced class arbitration waivers as 
part of the protected freedom of contract and despite their infringement 
on weaker parties’ rights.
And yet, in 2005, California’s Supreme Court famously responded 
to the problem by declaring class arbitration waivers unconscionable 
provided that these waivers were not negotiated and practically amounted 
to a deprivation of the right to litigate not only in courts but also in 
arbitration. Importantly, this admittedly narrow limitation was linked 
by the court to the idea of an exploitation of the legal right to contract 
by those with excessive bargaining power. Creating the Discover Bank v 
Superior Court 67 (“Discover Bank”) rule, which would later be abrogated 
by the new arbitration jurisprudence, the California Supreme Court 
emphasized the need to limit in certain situations — and via the doctrine 
of unconscionability — the freedom of contract of the stronger party. 
The Court explained: 
when the [class arbitration] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion 
in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably 
involve small amounts of damages, and ... the party with the superior bargaining 
power has [allegedly] carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver ... 
[is] unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.68
67. 113 P (3d) 1100 (Cal Sup Ct 2005) [Discover Bank].
68. Ibid at 1110.
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For several years, courts followed the Discover Bank rule and applied it 
both in the context of consumer contracts as well as in some employment 
contracts.69 This is precisely what the California Court of Appeals did in 
the litigation between AT&T and its consumers who contested the fact 
that the company charged them taxes on mobile phones it advertised as 
being given for free.70 Since the overcharge was relatively small and could 
not possibly allow for an individual litigation, the consumers initiated a 
class action thereby creating a need for the courts to decide the validity of 
the class arbitration waivers that were included in all of AT&T’s contracts. 
Following the rule of Discover Bank, the court of appeals decided to 
invalidate the waivers as unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeal affirmed.71 And then came the “revolution”.
After granting a certiorari, the Supreme Court decided in 2011 to 
abrogate the Discover Bank rule, forbidding courts around the country 
to use the doctrine of unconscionability in order to invalidate class 
arbitration waivers. This, of course, was not the first time the Supreme 
Court reversed a lower court’s decision ordering the enforcement of class 
arbitration waivers in consumer contracts.72 However, before AT&T, such 
a reversal was explained by a belief that the terms were not as inequitable 
as the lower court had seen them. And here lies the revolution: under the 
new jurisprudence the arbitration agreement is enforceable even when it 
is inequitable. In AT&T the Supreme Court emphasized for the first time 
that, when it comes to arbitration, freedom of contract trumps even when 
it is strategically used by the stronger party, not to channel litigation away 
from courts and into the private sphere, but rather to avoid litigation 
69. The Discover Bank rule relates to consumers’ contracts of adhesion. It was 
later extended to employment contracts: see Gentry v Superior Court, 165 
P (3d) 556 (Ca Sup Ct 2007) [Gentry]. But compare with Peter Danysh, 
“Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting AT&T v 
Concepcion to Consumer Adhesion Contracts” (2013) 50:5 Houston 
Law Review 1433 at 1462 (arguing that the court in Gentry ruled only 
on a claim for overtime pay pursuant to the Labor Code and its decision 
should not be read in a broader way).
70. Laster v T-Mobile USA Inc, 407 F Supp (2d) 1181 (SD Cal 2005). 
71. Laster v AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F (3d) 849 (9th Cir 2009). 
72. See e.g. Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v Randolph, 531 US 79 (2000).
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altogether. The Court confirmed corporates’ opportunistic drafting of 
contracts in a way that would block both the path to public litigation 
and the path to collective private litigation, even in cases where the third 
path — of individual arbitration — is undoubtedly futile. Notably, the 
new jurisprudence requires lower courts to refrain from using equity 
principles, and especially the unconscionability doctrine, even when one 
party — namely a big corporation — has abused its freedom of contract, 
creating a set of terms appearing like an agreement to settle disputes in 
arbitration but realistically having the opposite goal and effect: to make 
any review of disputes as difficult and improbable as possible.
Later efforts of lower courts to narrow the new AT&T rule of 
unlimited freedom and disempowered courts failed. In fact, two years 
after AT&T the Supreme Court extended its new jurisprudence even 
further, clarifying that the FAA preempted not only protections awarded 
under contract state law — mainly via the doctrine of unconscionability 
— but also rights secured under Federal law. In a litigation between 
American Express and a small restaurant named Italian Colors, the Court 
affirmed a class arbitration waiver that effectively prevented arbitration 
with regard to rights secured under Federal antitrust laws.73
What is unique about this arbitration jurisprudence and what marks 
it as “new”, or even “revolutionary”, is the willingness of the Court to 
approve and enforce any product of the freedom of contract as exercised 
by stronger parties, regardless of the consequences to the other party and 
to society as a whole. While this is not the first time we have seen a 
strong pro-arbitration jurisprudence that admittedly shrinks the ability 
of weaker parties to enforce their rights, in the past there were some 
safeguards and some limitations that remained in place. Specifically, until 
recently, lower courts always kept the tools of equity at their disposal. 
And, what is more, the legitimacy of utilizing those equity tools is 
explicitly guaranteed under the FAA itself. In its relevant section, the 
FAA clarifies that arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
73. American Express, supra note 14.
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revocation of any contract”.74
In other words, never before AT&T and American Express had it 
reached a point in which the Court recognized the harm to the weaker 
party but responded by saying that it is, to quote Justice Kagan’s dissent, 
“[t]oo darn bad”.75 And never before had the FAA been interpreted in a 
way that would officially offer corporations, to quote Kagan J again, “de 
facto immunity”,76 and “a foolproof way of killing off valid claims”.77 
Finally, never before were courts categorically forbidden from using 
equity tools to overcome extreme injustice caused by opportunistic use 
of the law.
B. The Meaning of New Arbitration Jurisprudence
What is the meaning of such new jurisprudence? At its most basic level, it 
reflects a heyday of the freedom of contract, comparable to the rise of the 
idea during the Lochner era. Again, we are witnessing a jurisprudence that 
refuses to limit the freedom of contract regardless of the consequences of 
such an unfettered version of freedom. And, similar to its predecessor, 
this second rise of the freedom of contract includes de-legitimization and 
a rejection of any state response that attempts to protect the rights of 
weaker parties and/or maintain a minimal level of social justice. To the 
extent that equity stands for the general quest for fairness and justice 
and for inhibiting the exploitation of the formality of law, the new 
jurisprudence does not leave room for it.
Moreover, and still in parallel to the Lochner era, the new 
jurisprudence aligns itself with the interests of stronger parties, such as 
those in AT&T and American Express, without admitting to it. The effect 
74. FAA, supra note 12 [emphasis added].
75. American Express, supra note 14 at 2313.
76. Ibid at 2315.
77. Ibid. For this aspect of the new jurisprudence see Glover, “Disappearing 
Claims”, supra note 16 (arguing that the “new approach erodes substantive 
law itself by empowering private parties, through contract, to frustrate or 
altogether eliminate claiming in any forum, and thereby to rewrite the 
scope of their obligations under substantive law” at 3066).
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is achieved by celebrating, and relentlessly enforcing, contracts drafted 
by strong parties and imposed on weaker parties, while portraying the 
contractual process as equal and reciprocal. To see that suffice is to pay 
attention to Scalia J’s rhetoric. In AT&T, Scalia J presents the logic of the 
freedom of contract in the context of arbitration, stating, “[t]he point of 
affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow 
for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute”.78 
This is the chosen rhetoric despite Scalia J’s awareness of the fact that the 
consumers in this case, and in any other case for that matter, lacked any 
freedom to design the arbitration process. Such awareness is expressed 
when Scalia J concedes, albeit in a different part of his decisions, that “the 
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive 
are long past”.79 And yet, awareness of this reality does not stop Scalia J 
from presenting the contractual process as free and further referring to 
its result — six times along the decision — as establishing a “bilateral” 
arbitration,80 implying that both parties exercised their freedoms and 
chose arbitration as the best way to mutually resolve their future disputes.
So far the new arbitration jurisprudence may seem as though it is 
mainly a revival of the Lochner era. However, much more is at stake. First 
of all, applying Lochnerian ideas to our times exponentially magnifies 
their effect. While old Lochnerism glamorized the freedom of contract 
mainly in the domain of industrial labor, the new jurisprudence covers 
incalculably larger amount of contracts that impact consumers, patients, 
clients, borrowers, franchisees, small investors, and virtually all other 
individuals and businesses who do not belong within a powerful “corporate 
America”. Similarly, while Lochnerism limited state legislators from 
interfering in the market, the new jurisprudence additionally restricts, as 
seen in AT&T itself, the work of courts around the country. And finally, 
while Lochner deprived weaker parties of rights awarded to them under 
law, the new jurisprudence, as I will further discuss later, additionally 
deprives them of rights arising from the principles of equity. In other 
words, part of what is new here is the magnitude of the phenomenon of 
78. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1749.
79. Ibid at 1750.
80. Ibid at 1745, 1749-51.
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celebrating the freedom of contract at the expense of other values.
However, this difference in scale, devastating as it is due to its role 
in intensifying inequalities and injustice, is only the tip of the iceberg. 
“More is at stake”, writes political scientist Wendy Brown, “than support 
for capital in the name of freedom”.81 In the coming part I will argue 
and demonstrate that the new-Lochnerism amounts to a “neoliberal-
Lochnerism” and that what we are witnessing is no less than a salient and 
very troubling phase in the dissemination of neoliberalism — one that 
thwarts equity principles both in theory and in practice.
C. The New Jurisprudence as a Neoliberal-Lochnerism
To be able to evaluate the magnitude of the risk, it is imperative to consider 
neoliberalism beyond all the ways in which it promotes economic policies 
aligning with the idea of a free market. Conceived by Pierre Bourdieu 
as “a political project”, neoliberalism works outside the economic field, 
not only within it. Indeed, careful observation with a critical eye reveals 
that neoliberalism stealthily operates to create a new “order of normative 
reason”,82 to redefine rationality, and to enforce itself as the common 
sense of all subjects, while denying the possibility of other logics. In this 
way, neoliberalism has the ability to change the way we understand the 
world, process our experiences, and respond to challenges. As Margaret 
Thatcher once said: “[e]conomics are the method, but the object is to 
change the soul”.83 But how is the objective of changing souls achieved? 
As Wendy Brown argues, law is an important medium through which 
neoliberalism disseminates its logic beyond the economy; and, as I 
will argue next, the new arbitration jurisprudence provides a powerful 
demonstration of such an operation.
The legal reasoning of the Supreme Court in the cases creating the 
new arbitration jurisprudence works to disseminate neoliberal rationality 
and to revise our common sense in at least three major ways. First, it 
frames the legal question of arbitration contracts’ enforceability solely 
81. Brown, supra note 20 at 153.
82. Ibid at 30.
83. Ibid at 153.
363(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
in neoliberal terms, creating a strong economized discourse in an arena 
formerly belonging to the justice system: that of dispute resolution. This 
strong discourse silences and vanquishes a host of other discourses, with 
the main victim being — as later further discussed — an equity discourse 
aimed at the prevention of unconscionable conduct. Second, and relying 
on this economized discourse, the same legal reasoning operates as an 
assault on the collective agency of legal subjects, applying a “divide and 
conquer” tactic that not only isolates and wears off weaker subjects but 
also, and alchemically, makes them — and them alone — responsible 
for their poor fate. And third, this neoliberal reasoning is gaining broad 
popularity outside the elite because it is presented as universal, while the 
fact that it is biased and reflects only the viewpoints of the most powerful 
market actors is carefully disguised. All in all, the new rationality takes 
over not only the economy and the market, but also the justice system. 
Consequently, and for the second time in history, the law conflicts with 
equity and all it stands for. This time, however, King James I is not there 
to side with equity.84 In what follows I will demonstrate each of the three 
neoliberal moves that, together, create this effect.
1. Economized Discourse
Under the new rule of AT&T, the FAA is interpreted as preempting the 
state-level contractual doctrine of unconscionability. Similarly, under 
American Express, the FAA preempts the doctrine of effective vindication 
of Federal rights. Together, these two decisions may leave parties 
with inferior bargaining power with no legal recourse against the big 
corporations that had them sign a class arbitration waiver. But why? What 
is the shared logic that justifies this dramatic result? The key, according 
to Scalia J and the four other justices that sided with him, is efficiency. 
And not just an abstract notion of efficiency: as Scalia J explains and 
then reiterates in AT&T, it is all about economic efficiency, concretely 
measured by “costs”, “savings”, and “speed”.85 Instead of the “costliness 
84. King James I famously decided to favor equity after the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case in Chancery (1615), Rep Ch 1 (Eng) at 7 [Earl of Oxford]. 
85. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1751-52.
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and delays of [public] litigation”, states Scalia J as if he were the proud 
CEO of a successful firm, private arbitration offers “greater efficiency”, 
and allows for “streamlined proceedings and expeditious results”, while 
“reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution”.86 
Similar rhetoric is used by Scalia J again in American Express both by 
him citing the words of AT&T and by branding arbitration as a “speedy 
resolution”.87
Admittedly, the mechanism of arbitration is not perfect even according 
to Scalia J, as without judicial review there is an increased risk that “errors 
will go uncorrected”.88 However, to further economize the discourse, 
those possible errors, too, are framed not as justice-related issues, but 
rather are described in market terms. Translated to economic lingo those 
potential errors are analyzed as “costs”. Moreover, the proliferation of 
arbitration contracts despite the problem of errors — now re-termed as 
“costs” — is itself explained based on “the logic of profit-making”.89 As 
Scalia J points out, drafters of arbitration contracts still prefer to opt out 
of the public justice system because it makes sense to do so under the only 
rationality presented in the case — that of a cost and benefit analysis. He 
explains: “[d]efendants are willing to accept the costs of these errors in 
arbitration, since their impact is limited to the size of individual disputes, 
and presumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts”.90
The constant use of the idea and jargon of “incentives” further 
transforms the issue of arbitration into a purely economic one. For 
example, as an important part of his legal reasoning, Scalia J stresses in 
AT&T that invalidating class arbitration waivers “will have a substantial 
deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate”.91 Similarly, in American 
Express, Scalia J translates the argument of the restaurant that was not 
able to fund an individual litigation into “Economish” (the language of 
86. Ibid at 1749, 1751.
87. American Express, supra note 14 at 2312.
88. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1752.
89. Weiner, supra note 21 at 20.
90. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1752 [emphasis added].
91. Ibid.
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economics), presenting the problem not as a lack of access to justice,92 
but as having “no economic incentive to pursue [the restaurant’s] 
antitrust claims individually in arbitration”.93 And, surrendering to 
Scalia J’s rhetoric, the dissent in American Express replies that with the 
enforcement of class arbitration waivers, “companies have every incentive 
to draft their agreements to extract backdoor waivers of statutory rights, 
making arbitration unavailable or pointless”.94
The economized message of the new jurisprudence is additionally 
amplified by the type of evidence offered by the court. To “prove” the 
efficiency argument, Scalia J presents empirical data often used in the 
domain of economics: statistics. The information, produced by the 
American Arbitration Association as amicus curiae, is introduced due to its 
ability, according to Scalia J, to illustrate in numbers both the efficiency of 
individual arbitration and the inefficiency of class arbitration.95 This use 
of data is yet another signature move of neoliberalism where all things, 
including justice systems, could and should be measured in numbers and 
in terms of productivity. In order to decide whether to enforce arbitration 
contracts, the theory goes, we only need to measure how many disputes 
were resolved per time unit. Thus, “speed” is a repeating theme in AT&T 
and the arbitration proceedings are evaluated solely by their ability to 
bring a dispute to a quick resolution. 
Notably, despite their appearance, numbers and statistics are far 
from being objective measuring tools and can be manipulated. For 
the purpose of calculating the speed and quantifying the efficiency of 
legal proceedings, Scalia J assigns the concept of “resolution” with an 
oddly narrow meaning. For him, the term resolution only refers to 
the production of “judgment on the merits”, while other possible 
resolutions, such as “settlement[s], withdrawal[s], or dismissal[s]” do not 
92. See e.g. Charles L Knapp, “Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution 
in Contract Law” (2002) 71:3 Fordham Law Review 761 (describing 
arbitration as the “denial of access … to the law itself” at 782).
93. American Express, supra note 14 at 2310.
94. Ibid at 2315.
95. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1751.
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count.96 The choice to define a resolution so narrowly may be misleading, 
especially given the fact — recognized by Scalia J in another part of the 
decision — that class arbitrations often do not end in judgments on the 
merits precisely because defendant companies prefer to settle in order 
to avoid negative precedents. In any case, while the logic of defining 
a resolution in such an unusual manner is not explained in the case, it 
surely helps in presenting individual arbitrations as more “efficient” than 
class arbitrations. This special way of counting simply makes individual 
arbitrations produce more “resolutions”.
To conclude: by heavily using an economized efficiency rhetoric, 
applying a cost and benefit analysis, committing to incentive thinking, 
and supporting arguments with only quantitative measures, the legal 
reasoning in AT&T and American Express amounts to the building of what 
Bourdieu called a “strong discourse”.97 What Scalia J achieves through 
creating such discourse is an “economization” of the domain of dispute 
resolution. As any other economization, this too is done by “extending 
a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics”98 to 
noneconomic dimensions of life, in this case the functioning of our 
justice system as well as the civic rights and values that the system stands 
for. And, because economization targets noneconomic domains, it works 
to disseminate neoliberalism not just as an economic approach, but more 
so as a rationality, defining a new common sense for all.
Another salient component of the neoliberal economization of 
everything is the strong negation of alternative rationalities. To use 
economic terms: economization is also an effort to create a neoliberal 
monopoly within the “market of ideas”, a monopoly that would have the 
unleashed power to crush already existing competing logics and prevent 
the emergence of new ones. A few examples from AT&T and American 
96. Ibid.
97. Pierre Bourdieu, “Utopia of Endless Exploitation: the Essence of 
Neo-liberalism”, Le Monde Diplomatique (December 1998), online: Le 
Monde diplomatique <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu> 
(“neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many”; rather, it is a 
“strong discourse”) [Bourdieu].
98. Brown, supra note 20 at 30.
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Express can illustrate this feature. First, in AT&T, Scalia J determines 
that “contrary to the dissent’s view”, his interpretation of the FAA as a 
norm designed to promote arbitration is “beyond dispute”.99 The use 
of such language expresses not only disagreement with the dissent, but 
also a denial of the very effort to challenge the economized analysis and 
its presumption that arbitration is always positive (read: “efficient”). Put 
differently, once established that arbitration makes economic sense, the 
discussion ends and the matter becomes “beyond dispute” — so, it must 
be that the FAA means prioritizing arbitration under all circumstances 
and regardless of the consequences. 
Second, initially in AT&T and later in American Express, Scalia J 
dismisses the issue of injustice, calling it “unrelated”. Remarkably, 
situations in which the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
consequently leaves plaintiffs without neither public nor private path to 
redress is somehow classified as irrelevant to the discussion. To clarify: 
my point here is not that Scalia J had an obligation to agree with the 
dissent. Quite to the contrary, I argue for the importance of pluralism of 
approaches and against the monopolization of economized logic. Thus, it 
is not the disagreement between the justices that is my concern, but the 
attempt of Scalia J to deny the relevance of the dissent’s reasoning. How 
and why concerns about the unavailability of remedies are “unrelated” to 
the very matter of private dispute resolution are questions that remain 
unanswered by Scalia J, and thus must be answered by the underlying 
claim of neoliberalism to exclusivity. Indeed, this last proposition 
is confirmed in American Express, when Scalia J bluntly dismisses the 
possibility of a competing rationality, declaring an approach that prefers 
the goals of antitrust law to the goals of arbitration as nothing but 
“simply irrational”.100 The overall result is a claim that the economized 
understanding of the issue of private dispute resolutions is the only logical 
understanding and other perspectives are not less desirable, but rather, no 
longer imaginable or worth raising.
Interestingly, in both AT&T and American Express, the dissent 
99. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1749.
100. American Express, supra note 14 at 2309.
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attempted to resist the monopoly of economized thinking. In AT&T 
Justice Breyer contests the need to make decisions based on efficiency 
as the sole criteria, stating: “[t]he intent of Congress requires us to 
apply the terms of the Act without regard to whether the result would 
be possibly inefficient”.101 Likewise, in American Express Kagan J attacks 
the economized logic by pointing out its absurd result which offers 
corporations “a foolproof way of killing off valid claims”, instead of 
securing a “method of resolving disputes”.102 Furthermore, Kagan J 
goes beyond rejecting the logic of efficiency and insists on introducing 
significant fairness concerns. Enforcing class arbitration waivers when 
the plaintiff has no real way to use the path of individual arbitration, 
argues Kagan J, deprives the plaintiff “of his day in court”,103 and “confers 
immunity on a wrongdoer”.104And yet, as compelling as this resistance is, 
what is missing, perhaps due to long years of neoliberal dominance, is a 
fuller model of thinking; an alternative discourse which could be strong 
enough to counter the one produced by neoliberalism. As I later further 
discuss, it is at this point that equity-based discourse could have proved 
invaluable.
In any case, Scalia J’s response to Kagan J’s dissent in American Express 
further demonstrates that his economized logic tolerates no alternative 
approaches. “Truth to tell”, he writes quite impatiently, “our decision in 
AT&T Mobility all but resolves this case”.105 However, since what was at 
stake in AT&T was state law and what was at stake in American Express 
was federal law, it is unlikely that whatever was already decided in AT&T 
could directly settle the dispute in American Express. Perhaps what Scalia 
J means to say in this part of his decision is that in AT&T neoliberalism 
had already won the race between competing rationalities and therefore 
Kagan J’s dissent is repetitive in trying to challenge the victory; there is 
simply no room to reopen the question of how, that is according to which 
101. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc v Byrd, 470 US 213 at 219 (1985) [Dean Witter] 
as cited in AT&T, supra note 13 at 1758.
102. American Express, supra note 14 at 2315.
103. Ibid at 2314.
104. Ibid at 2318.
105. Ibid at 2312.
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rationality, to analyze the issue of class arbitration waivers.
2. An Assault on Collective Agency
Attention to rhetoric will also reveal that in both AT&T and American 
Express the Supreme Court did more than economize the issue of 
class arbitration waivers. Portraying class arbitrations as “slow” and 
“inefficient” is a necessary step but not a sufficient one for achieving 
the greater goals of the neoliberal project. Thus, an additional effort 
was made to represent class arbitrations as dangerous and malicious. 
Reading AT&T’s legal reasoning one first learns that class arbitrations 
are illegitimate because they are, to cite Scalia J, “manufactured”106 by 
the pre-revolution Discover Bank rule. Second, readers are told about the 
specter of chaos when, in a move typical to neoliberalism, the very idea of 
collective dispute resolution becomes a metaphor for public disorder.107 
Allowing class arbitrations, writes Scalia J in AT&T, “is likely to generate 
procedural morass”.108 And, proving that he chose his words intentionally 
and that these words are essential to his legal reasoning, Scalia J uses the 
same rhetorical reference to chaos, word for word, in American Express. 
Additionally, and in the same intimidating vein, the Court cautions that 
if courts are obligated to ensure that an individual resolution is viable as a 
condition to enforcing a waiver of class arbitration, the result would be a 
“litigating hurdle”,109 which “would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of 
speedy resolution”.110
And third, in addition to describing class arbitrations as a 
manufactured, chaotic, and destructive method of dispute resolution, 
the procedure is also represented as unfair towards those being sued. 
According to this approach, class arbitrations are not a way for powerless 
claimants to make their small (AT&T) or prohibitively expensive 
106. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1751.
107. Henry A Giroux, “Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of 
Higher Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere” (2002) 
72:4 Harvard Educational Review 425 at 428. 
108. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1751 [emphasis added].
109. American Express, supra note 14 at 2312 [emphasis added].
110. Ibid [emphasis added].
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(American Express) claims. Instead, according to Scalia J, class arbitrations 
are a vicious tool utilized to bully corporations “into settling questionable 
claims”.111 And, tantamount to class actions carried in courts, private 
class arbitrations too carry “the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements”.112 The 
artificial victimization of powerful corporations will be further discussed 
in the next section, but for the time being the main point is this: the 
assault on collective legal actions includes judicial effort to demonize 
class arbitrations. 
Awareness of the Court’s evident hostility to class arbitration as 
expressed in AT&T and American Express can aid in understanding why 
the new arbitration jurisprudence belongs with the neoliberal project. 
If neoliberalism is, as theorized by Bourdieu, “a programme of the 
methodological destruction of collectives”,113 then the ongoing judicial 
attack on class arbitrations fits the premise. It is aimed at preventing 
consumers, workers, small businesses, and the like, from creating legal 
collectives. Furthermore, such an approach deprives individuals with less 
market power of the one tool that may help them protect themselves: the 
ability to “band together to fight corporate abuses”.114
But why does neoliberalism attack collectives? The rationale may be 
clear if we recall that the suppression of both counter ideas and attempts 
of resistance rests at the core of the neoliberal aspiration for hegemony. 
For that reason, when collectives try to use joint power as a method of 
countering the power of big businesses, neoliberals identify a target for 
attack. From a neoliberal perspective, and in a paradoxical treatment 
of autonomy and freedom, “while individuals are supposedly free to 
choose, they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective 
institutions”.115 The general neoliberal assault on collectives, and the 
particular attack on institutionalized legal collaborations such as class 
procedures, is fundamentally a way to divide and conquer.
And yet, even if the assault on collectives makes sense from a neoliberal 
111. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1752.
112. Ibid.
113. Bourdieu, supra note 97. 
114. Brown, supra note 20 at 153.
115. Harvey, supra note 58 at 69.
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viewpoint: why would the Court get involved and spread the anti-
solidarity message? Since the judiciary is an arm of the state, the answer 
has to do with the general role of the state under the neoliberal scheme. 
The neoliberal state is supposed to have no public goals and is instead 
expected to serve the interests of powerful market actors. As a result, 
explains David Harvey, “the neoliberal state is necessarily hostile to all 
forms of social solidarity that put restraints on capital accumulation”.116 
And, if need be, the state will use its legal arm, resorting “to coercive 
legislation and policing tactics … to disperse or repress collective forms 
of opposition to corporate power”.117 Notably, this understanding of the 
role played by the Court accords with Kagan J’s metaphorical statement 
in American Express. Blaming the majority for promoting an ongoing 
and deliberate agenda against collective legal procedures, class actions 
and class arbitrations alike, Kagan J writes: “[t]o a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness 
of [class procedures] everything looks like a class action, ready to be 
dismantled”.118
But the assault on collective actions not only forces people to cope 
with power in isolation. Rather, its effect is enhanced by the neoliberal 
signature practice of responsibilization. As demonstrated by the history of 
dispute resolution, the neoliberal order first leaves subjects to the mercy 
of the market via the process of privatization, and then assigns to them 
liability for whatever harm they suffer while operating in the market. 
If under Lochnerian classical liberalism the contractual “choice” was 
framed as somehow serving the self-interest of the person who agreed to 
work for very long hours, this is no longer the case today. Neoliberalism 
has long abandoned the idealization of individuals’ self-interests, 
freely defined, as well as the belief that an invisible hand ensures the 
outcome is beneficial for all. Instead, subjects are reconfigured as self-
investors and self-providers and — regardless of their interests — are 
expected to align themselves with what would best serve the economy.119 
116. Ibid at 75.
117. Ibid at 77.
118. American Express, supra note 14 at 2320.
119. Brown, supra note 20 at 84.
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Accordingly, because individual arbitrations — as we have seen — are 
presumed “efficient”, i.e. making economic sense, it is the responsibility 
of individuals alone, and not of the state, to use arbitrations to solve 
their disputes with each other. And, when individuals neglect to self-
provide for justice by failing to arrange for a mechanism that actually 
secures resolution, they have no one else but themselves to blame. In 
other words, people — and not the state — are now responsible for both 
supplying a private mechanism of dispute resolution and for the quality of 
the resolution the mechanism yields. 
It is important to note that neoliberal “responsibilization” is an 
imposed process that significantly differs from a liberal exercise of human 
autonomy and agency. As explained by Wendy Brown, people are being 
responsibilized because neoliberalism, for its own political goals, “solicits 
the individual as the only relevant and wholly accountable actor”.120 
Such responsibilization is evident in the legal reasoning of Scalia J in 
both AT&T and American Express. The Court goes a long way to place 
gaps of power aside and to emphasize the binding contract to which the 
weaker party in each case had committed itself to. As opposed to the 
times of Lochner, the obligation to arbitrate of the consumers in AT&T 
and the small restaurant in American Express is no longer portrayed as 
serving their interests and thus as deserving enforcement. Rather, the 
justification for enforcement stems directly from formalistically framing 
the entire issue a contractual matter and then responsibilizing the parties 
who signed the dotted line. 
In AT&T, Scalia J opens his decision in describing the contract as 
if it were an agreement between equals, declaring: “Vincent and Liza 
Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of 
cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LCC”.121 Next, readers learn 
that the contract included a duty to arbitrate and, when AT&T was sued, 
it sought nothing more than to enforce its rights “under the terms of 
its contract with the Concepcions”.122 To remove any doubt regarding 
the appropriate nature of the discussion Scalia J reminds readers that 
120. Ibid at 133.
121. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1744.
122. Ibid at 1744-45.
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“arbitration is a matter of contract”,123 strongly implying what it is not: a 
privatized form of dispute resolution carried as an alternative to a service 
once supplied exclusively by the state via the court system. And, defined 
as a contract, arbitration is, according to this logic, merely a matter of 
business exchange in which one simply gets what one bargained for. Or, 
as Scalia J describes the bargain: “parties forgo the procedural rigor and 
appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private 
dispute resolution”.124
But what if the bargain conflicts with the interests of one of the 
parties? That, we learn, has no room in the analysis. The only line of 
reasoning is repeated, as if it were a mantra: “[a]rbitration is a matter of 
contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations”.125 
And in this way, the Concepcions, like all people not lucky enough to 
receive services from an in-house legal department that drafts smart 
contracts, are configured as self-investors who may have made a bad 
investment decision. Did they have any alternatives? Could they have 
negotiated better with AT&T or purchased their mobile phones from 
another corporation that allows class arbitration in the event that things 
go wrong? Those questions lie outside of the responsibilizing neoliberal 
analysis under which responsibility is imposed notwithstanding context. 
Similar logic is applied in American Express. Once again, Scalia J 
opens with representing the contract as if it suffered from no gaps in the 
bargaining power of the parties. Italian Colors, described by the dissent 
as “a small restaurant”,126 is represented by the majority as “merchants 
who accept American Express cards”.127 Next, the first and primary fact 
readers learn about those “merchants” is that “[t]heir agreement with … 
American Express … contains a clause that requires all disputes between 
the parties to be resolved by arbitration”.128 Echoing AT&T, the Court 
then declares that “arbitration is a matter of contract”, adding that “courts 
123. Ibid at 1752.
124. Ibid at 1751.
125. Ibid at 1752.
126. American Express, supra note 14 at 2313.
127. Ibid at 2308.
128. Ibid.
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must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements”.129 But what happens 
to the concern for “the policies of the antitrust laws”130 that might be 
compromised if small restaurants cannot have any legal recourse against 
American Express? At this moment responsibilization seems to be the 
Courts’ only way of answering: small restaurants have “to litigate their 
claims individually — as they contracted to do”.131
It is important to recognize that responsibilization is a key stage in 
the “divide and conquer” strategy of neoliberalism. After institutionalized 
solidarities — such as class legal procedures — are extinguished, what 
remains is an isolated entity. At this point responsibilization finishes off 
what anti-solidarity has started: the subject, and the subject alone, is 
held responsible for the consequences of his or her behavior. Moreover, 
the assault on legal solidarities and the responsibilization that follow 
it are not only facilitated by the economization of everything, but are 
also facilitators of enhanced economization. At the most basic level 
economization invites anti-solidarity and responsibilization because, 
under economic measures, the inefficiency of class arbitrations justifies 
their abolition and the frame of a bargain (or contract) calls for “rigorous 
enforcement” of class arbitration waivers. However, perhaps less 
noticeably, anti-solidarity and responsibilization also operate to establish 
the supremacy of economized rationality. It is precisely because subjects 
are responsibilized that social questions regarding fairness and justice can 
be dismissed as “unrelated”, and not worth serious consideration. Due 
to the totality of responsibilization, which assigns a hundred percent of 
the responsibility to individual subjects, other candidates are completely 
released from responsibility. Accordingly, the Court does not have to 
discuss questions of fairness and justice because these issues were already 
fully resolved by responsibilizing the parties who signed arbitration 
agreements that effectively deprived them of access to justice. Or, as 
Kagan J more straightforwardly phrases it, when parties to contracts find 
themselves alone and with no legal recourse, it is “[t]oo darn bad”;132 no 
129. Ibid at 2309.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid [emphasis added].
132. Ibid at 2313.
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other alternative can be imagined. 
3. A Biased Approach in a Universal Disquise
As we have seen, the neoliberal approach to arbitration agreements 
aligns itself with the interests of the economic elite: arbitration is to be 
judged according to economic criteria, those criteria dictate resistance 
to collective resolution of disputes, and it is thus sensible to enforce 
arbitration agreements while leaving the powerless party without any 
recourse against their powerful drafters. However, an additional step is 
required in order to spread these ideas successfully and to turn them 
into the new common sense: the biased nature of the approach must 
be concealed and the supporting reasoning has to be represented as a 
universal truth. Indeed, the neoliberal turn was accomplished, and its 
results have since been maintained and enhanced, via an intentional effort 
to gain broad popularity and to appeal to everyone. A key strategy has 
been aligning neoliberalism with the American dream and establishing 
it “as the exclusive guarantor of freedom”.133 This general strategy is 
particularly powerful whenever the law is used as a medium by which 
neoliberal ideas are disseminated. The foundation, as we have seen, has 
been in place since the Lochner era’s celebration of the idea of the freedom 
of contract as a universal freedom shared by employers and employees 
alike. In the new arbitration jurisprudence, however, freedom in the 
Lochnerian sense, defined as “the liberty of the individual in adopting 
and pursuing such calling as he may choose”,134 is less emphasized, which 
should not be surprising given neoliberalism’s disregard for matters of 
personal fulfillment. Instead, the Court is making statements that, coming 
from the judiciary, seem universal and neutral but in fact represent only 
the perspective of the economic elite.
In reading AT&T we learn, for example, that the reason for allowing 
unlimited freedom of contract regarding the design of arbitration 
processes is “efficiency”. This freedom can be used in many ways; one 
such way may be to ensure “that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the 
133. Harvey, supra note 58 at 40.
134. Lochner, supra note 11 at 63.
376 
 
Keren, Undermining Justice
relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential to protect trade 
secrets”.135 At first glance, this statement appears as a neutral description 
of the advantages of arbitration, one that applies equally to both parties 
regardless of each party’s respective economic positioning. In reality, 
however, this is far from being the case. 
First, at the most general level, counter to what is implied by Scalia 
J’s rhetoric, it is not the “parties”, in the plural, who are afforded the 
“discretion in designing arbitration”,136 but only the drafting party. The 
less powerful party has to follow the “design” imposed by the drafting 
party or otherwise forgo the transaction altogether — a step that would 
be pointless considering that all similar big businesses happen to insist 
on arbitrations with a similar “design”. Second, another large crack in the 
neutral façade is the utilization of the freedom of design to protect trade 
secrets. Evidently, workers, consumers, patients, and other powerless 
parties simply do not have “trade secrets” to protect. And third, regarding 
the freedom to have experts decide disputes, data gathered and published 
by journalists and consumer advocates demonstrates that substituting 
public judges with specialists imposes an expensive burden often carried 
by plaintiffs who are required to pay filing fees.137 For all these reasons 
combined, what is presented as a freedom enjoyed by both parties equally, 
in fact is only a freedom from the perspective of the powerful party, and 
in contrast, a major obstacle for the weaker party.
Furthermore, when the AT&T Court describes the disadvantages 
of class arbitrations, it does so while entirely adopting the perspective 
of the powerful drafters and ignoring that of their weaker counterparts. 
However, the biased analysis is still presented as a universal truth. For 
example, the Court counts as a general problem the fact that, in class 
arbitrations, “[c]onfidentiality becomes more difficult”.138 However, this 
is a detriment only from the perspective of the stronger party who is 
interested in fending claims off. The other, weaker party, in contrast, may 
135. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1749.
136. Ibid.
137. Jamie Court, Corporateering: How Corporate Power Steals Your Personal 
Freedom (New York: Jeremy P Tarcher & Putnam, 2003) at 102.
138. AT&T, supra note 13 at 1750.
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be quite interested in sharing information with other similarly-situated 
claimants. Comparably, Scalia J states that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to 
the higher stakes of class litigation”,139 but readers should ask themselves: 
higher stakes for whom? Again, this general statement is only true for 
stronger parties while weaker parties, such as consumers or workers, each 
typically have much smaller individual claims. The same pattern appears 
when the Court comments that allowing class arbitrations “will have a 
substantial deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate”;140 once more, this 
statement only applies to big businesses while the opposite is true for 
their weaker counterparts.
In response to the bias argument one may answer that the new 
arbitration jurisprudence merely expresses a belief in free markets 
without necessarily reflecting a biased outlook in favor of economic 
elites. And yet, the decision in American Express demonstrates that, 
when faced with a need to choose between a loyalty to the market and a 
loyalty to big businesses, the Court chose to protect the interests of the 
economic elite, disguising its choice with a seemingly neutral formalistic 
reasoning regarding the hierarchy between two Federal norms. As 
mentioned earlier, in American Express a small restaurant claimed that 
a giant financial company used its monopolist power in a manner that 
threatens the level of competition in the market. The Court, however, 
blocked the claim from being discussed by limiting the restaurant to an 
individual arbitration that it could not possibly afford. In other words, 
the Court was willing to enforce a class arbitration waiver even when such 
enforcement risks the level of competition in the market by decreasing 
the effectiveness of antitrust laws.141 Such willingness demonstrates that 
the Court adopted a legal reasoning that reflects a specific perspective — 
which belongs to the drafting powerful parties — even when it meant 
sacrificing central principles of economic efficiency.
139. Ibid at 1752.
140. Ibid at 1752, n 8.
141. See Glover, “Disappearing Claims”, supra note 16.
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IV. The Fall of Equity
With its contribution to the dissemination of neoliberal rationality, the 
new arbitration jurisprudence does not leave much room for equitable 
principles and directly attacks the logic of equity. This theoretical and 
practical threat operates at various levels. First, and most evident, is the 
negative effect that recent decisions, and mainly the one in AT&T, have 
on judges’ ability to use the unconscionability principle. However, my 
argument is not limited to this unfortunate result and seeks to go much 
deeper. The second problem is that in a contractual world without an 
effective unconscionability principle, the freedom of contract becomes 
a biased concept and thus a prison for most individuals. Third, and 
more broadly, when the law is being used to disseminate neoliberalism 
as a controlling rationality, the logic of equity, and with it, its theoretical 
justification are on the fall. Finally, as a result of this three-layer process, 
law itself loses touch with justice and its legitimacy is severely undermined.
A. The Fall of Unconscionability
Recall that the FAA itself allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration 
agreements on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract”.142 According to this clear language, there should not have 
been a question regarding the legitimacy of using the unconscionability 
doctrine to invalidate the terms of arbitration agreements because the 
doctrine allows revocation of contracts under both equity and the law.143 
Admittedly, even before AT&T many judges and theorists argued against 
excessive use of unconscionability for the purposes of invalidating 
predatory contracts, within and outside of the context of arbitration.144 
And yet, there is something fundamentally different in AT&T’s approach. 
Unlike other unconscionability opponents Scalia J is not engaging in a 
debate regarding the desirability of frequent use of the doctrine. Instead, 
142. FAA, supra note 12.
143. In California, the state of the AT&T litigation, the unconscionability 
doctrine is part of a legislated code. 
144. For a description of this approach see Keren, “Guilt-Free Markets”, supra 
note 30.
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his approach entirely disallows judges to use the doctrine in the context 
of arbitration. It does so despite the clear language of the FAA permitting 
the use, and more importantly, precisely at the core of the domain of the 
unconscionability principle — when it is obvious that the drafters of 
the contract have intentionally misused the contractual tool to prevent 
dispute resolution rather than to secure it.
Not surprisingly, some state courts have found the new ban on an 
old judicial tool frustrating and have demonstrated resistance.145 In at 
least two states, namely West Virginia and Oklahoma, the state Supreme 
Court openly disregarded the decision, invoking a reprimanding response 
from the Supreme Court that powerfully enforced its new arbitration 
jurisprudence.146 Other state courts have persistently tried to find ways 
to limit the scope of the new jurisprudence and also tried to define at 
least some areas in which unconscionability — or other tools — can 
continue to be utilized in order to release parties from unfair contractual 
waivers of their rights. Important examples of such an approach, within 
the context of employment, emerged post-AT&T in California. In Sonic 
Calabasas A, Inc v Moreno,147 Justice Goodwin Liu wrote on behalf of the 
majority that, even after AT&T and American Express, “the exercise of 
[unconscionability] as applied to arbitration agreements remains intact, 
as the FAA expressly provides”.148 However, this exercise “remains intact” 
primarily in theory, while in practice the new arbitration jurisprudence 
makes it hard to carve out areas not preempted by the FAA.
In a creative effort to define such areas, despite the decision in AT&T, 
Liu J drew a line between waivers of class arbitration, which can no longer 
be invalidated, and waivers of special protections offered to employees 
145. Lyra Haas, “The Endless Battleground: California’s Continued Opposition 
to the Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act Jurisprudence” (2014) 
94:4 Boston University Law Review 1419 at 1421 (describing California’s 
continued resistance to the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of 
the FAA); James Dawson, “Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons 
from the State Courts” (2014) 124:1 Yale Law Journal 233. 
146. See Salvatore U Bonaccorso, “State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration 
Law” (2015) 67:5 Stanford Law Review 1145 at 1158.
147. 311 P (3d) 184 (Cal Sup Ct 2013). 
148. Ibid at 201.
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under a “Berman hearing” — an informal administrative proceeding 
designed to help employees bring wage claims. Justice Liu acknowledged 
that post-AT&T, courts can no longer use unconscionability in a manner 
that will categorically delay or prolong the arbitration process. And 
yet, he insisted, courts are still allowed to exercise an unconscionability 
inquiry regarding the total fairness of the scheme of arbitration because, 
in doing so, they are taking into account the substantive rather than the 
procedural protections that were surrendered by the employee. In this 
way, utilizing unconscionability does not necessarily have the effect of 
slowing down what is supposed to be a speedy process. Such an inquiry, 
explained Liu J, should focus “on whether the arbitral scheme imposes 
costs and risks on a wage claimant that make the resolution of the wage 
dispute inaccessible and unaffordable, and thereby ‘effectively blocks 
every forum for the redress of disputes, including arbitration itself ’”.149As 
one court recently summarized, Liu J’s approach is “that post-Concepcion, 
California courts may continue to enforce unconscionable rules that do 
not ‘interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration’”.150
Despite those efforts to save a sliver of the traditional uses of 
unconscionability much of the original power of this equity-based 
doctrine seems to be lost. For hundreds of years unconscionability has 
been used by courts as a broad standard and as an overarching principle. 
Its power — as well as its vulnerability to criticism — stem from its 
generality and resilience to manipulation. At least in theory, the principle 
applies regardless of whatever form of contractual harshness was used by 
the stronger party and courts are always authorized to undo the unfair 
results achieved by abusing the contractual mechanism and the freedoms 
it affords. Thus, chopping unconscionability to pieces while disallowing 
courts the use of most of the pieces — that is when there might be an 
interference with attributes of arbitration — is insidious to the core of 
the principle.
149. Ibid at 293, citing Gutierrez v Autowest Inc, 114 Cal (4th) 77 at 90 (App 
Ct 2003).
150. Carlson v Home Team Pest Defense Inc, 2015 Cal App Ct Lexis 702.
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To be sure, the “rise and fall of unconscionability”151 is a general trend 
in American jurisprudence not limited to arbitration agreements and in 
and of itself relates to our neoliberal age.152 However, it is imperative to 
realize that paralyzing the unconscionability principle in the context of 
arbitration looms larger than any other limitation of the principle and 
hence risks its general survival. This is the magnitude of the problem 
because, by drafting sophisticated arbitration schemes, stronger parties 
use their freedom of contract to avoid all their other obligations — 
statutory and contractual alike. Even in a neoliberal age, non-drafting 
parties such as workers and consumers may have some rights under 
applicable regulations and/or under their respective contracts. For 
example, employees may be entitled to a certain combination of wages 
and benefits. And yet, these rights are meaningless when they are subjected 
to an arbitration scheme that makes them virtually unenforceable — an 
effect that is achieved by arbitration terms that block access not only to the 
public justice system but also to its privatized alternative. Put differently, 
when courts are subject to the new arbitration jurisprudence and can 
no longer use unconscionability against unjust arbitration schemes, they 
are left powerless and helpless. Placed in this weakened position, courts 
cannot cope with abuses of the freedom of contracts. This, in turn, yields 
a passive affirmation of predatory behavior and encourages wrongdoers 
to further exploit their superior status and their unlimited — and ever 
growing — power.
B. Freedom as Prison
Initially, the Court of the Lochner era established a general freedom of 
contract strong enough to constitutionally defeat the legislative power 
of the states. About a century later, the Court has engaged in a second 
wave of Lochnerism, framing private dispute resolution as a contract 
and demanding rigorous enforcement of its terms even if the drafters 
have used their freedom to design a contract that makes them immune 
151. Anne Fleming, “The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the ‘Law of the 
Poor’” (2014) 102:5 Georgetown Law Journal 1383.
152. For a discussion see Keren, “Guilt-Free Markets”, supra note 30.
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to legal challenges. This version of freedom is strong enough to defeat 
the judicial power of the state, thereby rendering salient contractual 
and statutory rights unenforceable. Taken together, the two rises of the 
freedom of contract accumulate to a version of freedom that ends up 
imprisoning masses of people. Freedom turns into imprisonment because 
of the biased way it has been defined. As it stands today, the freedom of 
contract encompasses only aspects of freedom that are fully available and 
meaningful for the most powerful market players: big corporations and 
their most wealthy individual owners. At the same time, the concept does 
not include the kind of freedoms that matter most to all other members 
of society who have to work for a living and struggle with handling their 
finances. To see this point more clearly, it is important to distinguish 
between the different components of the freedom of contract and the 
way these components operate to both enhance legitimate choices and 
inhibit state interference.
Considering the freedom of contract as a freedom of private choice 
reveals that the freedom refers to several sets of choices. Organized 
chronologically, according to the typical progress of the conventional 
contracting process, there are three main freedoms of choice. First, people 
have a choice in assuming contractual liability. At the very core of private 
ordering lies the notion of self-imposed obligations and thus, at least in 
theory, a party should be subject to a contractual liability only if he or 
she voluntarily assumed such a liability. Unless and until one consents, 
one has what theorists call a freedom from contract — the right to avoid 
contractual liability despite being involved in a bargaining process.153
Second, once a desire to contract exists, a party should be free to 
choose with whom to form it, and thus can ignore or reject those he or 
she does not wish to engage with. I shall call this aspect of the freedom 
of contract the freedom to select a contractual partner. Third, and most 
commonly associated with the general idea of the freedom of contract, 
contracting parties have the freedom to choose the content of their 
contractual obligations. Following others, I shall call this aspect of the 
153. Omri Ben-Shahar, “Foreword to Freedom from Contract Symposium” 
(2004) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 261. 
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freedom of contract the freedom to design the contract.154
Combined, the three freedoms — the freedom from a contract, the 
freedom to select one’s partner, and the freedom to design the terms of 
the deal — create the conventional positive meaning of the “freedom 
of contract” — a party’s freedom “to decide whether, with whom, and 
under what terms to enter contracts that then become the source of his 
other-regarding obligations”.155 Most of the time, however, theorists do 
not engage in an analysis of the idea, let alone in critically reviewing its 
meaning. This is partially a result of treating the freedom of contract 
as an axiom, or, under the influence of the Lochner era, as a natural 
right or liberty of humans that consequently needs no justification. 
Most importantly, as rooted in the human will and in the autonomy 
of individuals, the general idea of the freedom of contract has been 
presumed universal, held by all humans living in Western societies. 
The freedoms comprising the freedom of contract have been 
understood as requiring the imposition of severe limitations on the exercise 
of state power. Put simply, for the freedom of contract to mean anything 
the state has to refrain from interfering in the private arena. Respecting 
individuals’ autonomy essentially means enforcing the contracts they 
have made while using their freedom to design their contracts. As we 
have seen, in the name of the freedom of contract, state acts have been 
harshly criticized and emphatically invalidated. For more than a century, 
the idea of the freedom of contract has become synonymous with laissez-
faire capitalism, anti-regulatory approach, and an outright rejection of 
centralized efforts to promote welfare. And, as the literal translation of 
“laissez faire” from French suggests, the main idea has been that the state 
must “leave alone” its citizens to determine their economic affairs.
My argument here is that the kind of freedom of contract that 
we ended up having post-Lochner and post-Concepcion celebrates the 
freedom of choice of the strongest market players at the expense of the 
many weaker parties who contract with them. Instead of a universal 
freedom guaranteed to all, as the myth goes, we face an unlimited 
154. Ibid at 263.
155. West, “Right to Contract”, supra note 54 at 555.
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freedom for some while all others are weakened and enslaved by the idea. 
A leading feature of the biased nature of the freedom of contract is that 
the three recognized sub-freedoms discussed above — the freedom from 
contract, the freedom to select one’s contractual partner and the freedom 
to design the deal — are mostly enjoyed by subjects who belong within 
the economic elite.
First, only the most powerful market players enjoy a true freedom 
from contract and can choose whether or not — and when — to subject 
themselves to contract law. Those with less market power seldom have 
such privileges. This is partially because in an age of growing privatization 
— after the state had removed itself from so many areas of life — people 
have to get what they need, including vital necessities such as education 
and health services, via private contracts. More importantly, oftentimes 
individuals with limited economic power are not as free to opt out of a 
contractual regime as their stronger counterparts may be. For instance, 
typically, a weaker party must get a job that requires signing a contract, 
followed by a cell phone and a service plan — via a contract — in order 
to keep in touch with his or her children while on the job. Moreover, 
since this individual may not own property he or she ought to rent the 
apartment to which he or she will return at night after a day on the job. 
It becomes clear that, in this way of life, there is little to no place for the 
freedom from contract.
Second, and related, with limited means comes a way of life that is 
remarkably different from that of the upper class. This difference often 
entails an inability to select one’s contractual partner. For example, 
those living in smaller towns or rural areas have to work for the main 
employer in the area in order to support their families. Others, living 
in urban neighborhoods, must buy their groceries from the local food 
store, especially if they are limited to using public transportation due to 
a lack of a car. Many people around the country have no choice but to 
send their children to certain schools or colleges and to see only certain 
doctors primarily because other education or medical opportunities are 
not affordable. As these examples demonstrate, the freedom to select a 
contractual partner is not a universal privilege, but a luxury only enjoyed 
by the wealthiest within society. 
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Third, and most relevant to the arbitration context, is the freedom to 
design the contract. It goes without saying that with limited bargaining 
power and without the resources to hire the best lawyers or even receive 
legal advice, many subjects — like the bakery’s employees in Lochner or 
the consumers in AT&T — have virtually no such freedom to design 
nor any other way to influence the content of the contract. As Scalia 
J pointed out in AT&T, in our days most contracts are contracts of 
adhesion, which are drafted solely by the stronger party, or, more 
precisely, by the legal department held by the stronger party. The results, 
described in detail by Margret Radin in her notable book Boilerplate,156 
are lengthy and complex contracts that no common person can read or 
understand — a fact that gives the drafters ultimate control over the 
terms of the contract. It is now acknowledged and well documented, 
for example, that in the notorious case of subprime lending much of the 
damage to vulnerable borrowers has been caused by complex terms that 
were deliberately drafted to be incomprehensible due to the overuse of 
fine print and confusing legalese.157 Moreover, the freedom to design the 
contract includes not only controlling the terms of the deal but also its 
fundamental structuring. A recent example is the design of the agreements 
between Uber and its drivers, in which the drafting company structured 
the relationship as existing outside of the employment realm, thereby 
depriving the drivers of rights that are only available to employees.158 In 
other words, aside from rare occasions in which weaker parties interact 
with one another, they enjoy no freedom to design their contracts.
What is worse, more often than not the one-sidedly designed 
contracts are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and thus weaker parties 
are also lacking the more basic freedom of negotiating the contract 
that was originally drafted by the other party.159 Many times, the pre-
156. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the 
Rule of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
157. Elizabeth Warren, A Fighting Chance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2014) at 139. 
158. See e.g. O’Connor v Uber Techs, 2015 US Dist Ct Lexis 116482 (ND Cal).
159. Brian H Bix, “Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic 
Degradation” (2013) 49:2 Tulane Law Review 501.
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designed contract is not negotiable because weaker parties so badly and 
so urgently need the underlying transaction — a job, a loan, a place 
to stay — that they have no leverage to negotiate anything. At other 
times, even when alternative transactions are available — several phone 
carriers, various lenders, or a host of landlords — the parties offering the 
necessities all knowingly insist on the same terms and rely on the fact 
that their weaker counterparts have no other choice regarding the terms 
of the deal. Arbitration agreements are a pertinent example of this type 
of negotiability problem because most, if not all, of the drafting parties 
demand similar harsh terms such as the class arbitration waivers discussed 
earlier. For these reasons, whenever a gap in the bargaining power exists 
— which is the rule rather than the exception — only stronger parties 
enjoy the freedom to design their contracts and control their content.
Another considerable aspect of the biased conceptualization of 
the freedom of contract is that, at the same time that the recognized 
freedoms are those that matter most to stronger parties, other freedoms 
— crucially needed by subjects with less economic resources — are either 
completely unacknowledged or significantly undervalued. Despite the 
inherent difficulty in describing things that have no name, I would like 
to suggest that, in general, the missing freedoms reflect areas in which 
stronger parties typically do not struggle and therefore never had to 
phrase, frame, and defend as freedoms. 
One missing freedom is the freedom to have a contract. 
Notwithstanding the myth of equality, not everybody enjoys this basic 
freedom.160 When an owner of a property refuses to lease apartments 
to people who are, for example, disabled, elderly, or single mothers, the 
rejected tenants have no “freedom of contract” whatsoever. In fact, they 
cannot even enter the contractual arena. While the freedom to participate 
in the market via contracts is axiomatically guaranteed to powerful 
subjects, it is an uncertain and fragile freedom from the perspective of 
those with limited means. A current and prominent example is the rapidly 
growing fringe banking industry. This industry is based on vulnerable 
160. Hila Keren, “‘We Insist! Freedom Now’: Does Contract Doctrine Have 
Anything Constitutional to Say?” (2005) 11:1 Michigan Journal of Race 
& Law 133 [Keren, “We Insist”].
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borrowers who have to take high-cost predatory loans, usually because 
big banks refuse to contract with them. Notably, such refusal relies on 
the recognized freedom — discussed above — of the banks to select their 
contractual partners — a freedom which allows them to reject those 
with nonexistent or unsatisfactory credit history. Deprived of “prime” 
lending options, those borrowers are then forced to pay interest rates 
ranging from 300% per annum to over 1,000% per annum — rates that 
are sometimes 100 times higher than what is offered in the mainstream 
credit market.161 Notably, the freedom to have a contract has never been 
recognized as part of the canonic freedom of contract precisely because 
it has always been available for stronger parties and thus was taken for 
granted and did not require definition or protection. 
Another absent freedom is the freedom from contract, not in the 
recognized sense of freedom from having a contract or being subject 
to contract law, but rather a freedom from exploitation by contract. 
Borrowers in desperate need of a loan, for example, and many others with 
limited bargaining powers, need a different kind of freedom from contract 
than their stronger counterparts. They necessitate neither the ability to 
be left alone (laissez faire) nor the power to reject the supervision of the 
state. This is because these weaker parties are constantly manipulated 
by stronger market players who are targeting and exploiting them while 
using their superiority and own unbounded freedom of contract,162 
and thus need support and protection in the form of relief from 
inappropriate contracts. They have very little freedom of contract when 
the contractual tool is used against them and further impoverishes their 
limited resources. Importantly, like the freedom to have a contract, this 
freedom from contractual exploitation has never been recognized as part 
of the canonic freedom of contract because it is not within the interests 
of the economic elite. Since powerful market players are unlikely to be 
161. Nathalie Martin, “Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case 
for a Federal Usury Cap” (2014) 34:2 Northern Illinois University Law 
Review 259 at 269.
162. Daniel Immergluck, Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, and the 
Undermining of America’s Mortgage Market (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2011). 
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exploited, but rather are more likely to take advantage of less-powerful 
parties, a meaningful solution to the risk of exploitation has never been 
developed as a part of the freedom of contract.
Yet another aspect of the biased freedom of contract has to do 
with the involvement of the state. Despite the myth of a neutral and 
non-interfering state that stays away from the free market, it must be 
recognized that the freedom from state intervention is selectively applied. 
Under the neoliberal rationality, the state is paradoxically “compelled to 
serve and facilitate an economy it is not supposed to touch, let alone 
… challenge”.163 One leading way by which the state actively supports 
the strongest market players is by offering them unyielding enforcement 
services and presenting these services as necessarily flowing from the idea 
of the freedom of contract. The Supreme Court’s decision in American 
Express, for example, actively “permits and creates an incentive for entities 
to self-deregulate through private contract”.164 This form of active state 
support is crucial to the existence of the package of freedoms known 
as the freedom of contract since, without enforcement, the freedom to 
enter into a contract and freely design its terms would have meant very 
little. Furthermore, the biggest businesses and their organizations heavily 
rely on the state’s enforcement services and lobby for the preservation 
and expansion of these services. For example, many leading corporations 
and coalitions affiliated with them were involved in the legal battles over 
the enforceability of class arbitration waivers and invested considerable 
resources in convincing the Supreme Court to adopt the new arbitration 
163. Brown, supra note 20 at 40.
164. Glover, “Disappearing Claims”, supra note 16 at 3091.
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jurisprudence165 and, after their success, in resisting proposals to restore 
the pre-revolution order.166 It is therefore false to say that the state takes 
a neutral and minimal approach, nor is it true that such an approach is 
what the biggest corporations demand from the state. Rather, in reality 
what takes place and what is lobbied for is an asymmetric and biased 
format of state action: high levels of support and involvement on behalf 
of the few, combined with little to no activity on behalf of all others.
To further explain the last point, it may be useful to take a second 
look at some of the biases discussed above and to realize that amending 
each one of them would require a type of state intervention that is 
165. See e.g. AT&T, supra note 13 (amicus brief submitted to the Supreme 
Court by the Pacific Legal Foundation (“PLF”), 2010 US S Ct Briefs 
Lexis 1043 stating that “PLF was founded more than 35 years ago and 
is widely recognized as the largest and most experienced nonprofit legal 
foundation of its kind. PLF litigates matters affecting the public interest at 
all levels of state and federal courts and represents the views of thousands 
of supporters nationwide. Among other things, PLF’s Free Enterprise 
Project defends the freedom of contract, including the right of parties to 
agree by contract to the process for resolving disputes that might arise 
between them. To that end, PLF has participated as amicus curiae in 
many important cases involving the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and 
contractual arbitration in general, including this case at the petition stage” 
at 1); see also American Express, supra note 14 (amicus brief submitted to 
the Supreme Court by the Voice of the Defense Bar (DRI) 2012 US S Ct 
Briefs Lexis 3573 stating that DRI “… is an international organization 
of more than … [23,000] attorneys involved in the defense of civil 
litigation”. And adding that “DRI has long been a voice in the ongoing 
effort to make the civil justice system more fair … [and] efficient … ” 
at 1). In addition to special legal coalitions such as PLF and DRI, many 
big corporations, such as DIRECT TV, Comcast, and Dell, have directly 
submitted amicus briefs supporting rigorous enforcement of individual 
arbitrations: see e.g. 2010 US S Ct Briefs Lexis 1044 (amicus brief by the 
above corporations).
166. See e.g. Brian T Fitzpatrick, “The End of Class Actions?” (2015) 57:1 
Arizona Law Review 161 at 194-96 (describing the academic support 
of restoring the pre-Concepcion status quo and the pending bill that 
followed it, but estimating that “[g]iven the business community’s power 
in Washington, however, no one thinks this bill has much of a chance in 
the foreseeable future” at 197).
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fundamentally different from the current “rigorous enforcement”167 of 
contracts. As far as the freedom of design of the contract or at least the 
opportunity to negotiate the contract’s content is concerned, the state 
would need to regulate the length, language, and negotiability of standard 
contracts drafted by powerful businesses. Similarly, with regard to the 
missing freedom to have a contract, to ensure the freedom of those left 
behind would require the state to compel stronger market players to give 
up some of their freedom to select their partners and to impose on them a 
duty to contract with others without discrimination.168 In the same vein, 
to establish freedom from exploitation by contracts would require the state 
to limit its enforcement services and refrain from offering enforcement 
services in cases in which the freedom to design the contract’s terms was 
abused to create a predatory result. 
The two rises of the freedom of contract — in the Lochner era 
and under the new arbitration jurisprudence — demonstrate how the 
neoliberal state moves in the opposite direction, using freedom not to 
enhance true individual sovereignty and wellbeing for all, but rather to 
lock people into their inferior status. The combination of two freedom-
branded ideas — the “freedom of contract”, which is in fact only the 
freedom of a small but strong group of subjects and the “freedom from 
the state”, which in reality includes extended enforcement services to the 
same group — turns the resulting “freedom” into a prison for all non-elite 
subjects. Surely, such an imprisoning notion of freedom severely harms 
those in the middle and the bottom of the socioeconomic spectrum while 
concealing the true nature of the process. The magnitude of the resulting 
harm equals the endless power reserved for contracts in a capitalist 
society. However, as the coming section suggests, another major harm is 
underway: as these changes occur in the market and within contract law, 
their effects spill over and corrode key principles of equity and with them 
the morality of the law.
167. Dean Witter, supra note 101 at 221.
168. State action via antidiscrimination laws is not awarding people a 
contractual freedom but only a tort claim. On the advantage of 
recognizing a contractual freedom in those situations, see Keren, “We 
Insist”, supra note 160.
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C. Undermining Equity’s Rationality
As my close reading of the new arbitration jurisprudence has sought 
to demonstrate, the dissemination of the neoliberal rationality via 
the medium of law entails an unwavering rejection of competing 
rationalities. Non-economic theories based on morality, fairness, justice, 
or equality — all once at the heart of any jurisprudence — are silenced, 
marginalized, and delegitimized. In the Anglo-American context, such 
a rejection of non-economized ways of thinking directly undermines 
equity’s rationality. 
To be sure, the legal tradition captured by the term equity is rich, 
diverse, and much contested among scholars, making it inherently 
imprecise to talk about equity’s rationality. And yet, since much of the 
power of the neoliberal project stems from effectively marketing simplified 
ideas (e.g. arbitration is efficient), a willingness to generalize and draw the 
picture with broad strokes is needed in order to expose the full impact of 
neoliberalism. With this goal in mind, I will put aside specific procedural 
and doctrinal aspects of equity, despite their importance, and focus on 
two core ideas that have been associated with equity and are particularly 
relevant in times of neoliberal economization.
One core idea is the role equity plays in keeping the law in line 
with conscience, which includes the prevention of immoral abuses of 
the law’s generality and formality. The other is the importance of a 
broad availability of legal remedies for any system of justice. Each of 
these interrelated core ideas, I argue, is an essential component of equity’s 
rationality — a rationality that strongly supports limiting the power of 
the freedom of contract. Together, they create a distinct legal “common 
sense” that generally disagrees with the one offered by the neoliberal 
project and particularly conflicts with the celebration of an unleashed 
contractual freedom. For that reason, the increasing legal support of 
neoliberalism severely challenges equity’s relevancy and legitimacy.
First comes the deep, and almost obvious, connection between equity 
and conscience. “[E]quity has long been associated with conscience”,169 
169. Dennis R Klinck, “The Unexamined ‘Conscience’ of Contemporary 
Canadian Equity” (2001) 46:3 McGill Law Journal 517 at 574.
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and there is little doubt that “historically conscience and equity were 
intimately allied, even synonymous”.170 As declared in the seminal Earl 
of Oxford’s Case, equity’s defined purpose has been “to correct men’s 
consciences”.171 Alternative explanations and criticisms regarding the 
ambiguity of the concept notwithstanding,172 what matters most is 
the strong discourse created by equating equity and conscience, making 
equity “the official discourse of conscience in the legal sphere”.173 Under 
such discourse, the law must include moral considerations and moral 
reasoning, features that have the effect of “taming” the law,174 while 
enabling “judges to justify equitable intervention on a moral basis”.175
How does this conscience-informed discourse relate to judicial 
decisions regarding the enforcement of contracts? The answer was most 
famously articulated in 1751 when Hardwicke LC explained that courts 
of conscience would not enforce agreements that “no man in his senses 
and not under delusion [could] make on the one hand, and … no honest 
and fair man would accept on the other”.176 Moreover, he also described 
those undeserving agreements by directly referring to conscience, naming 
them “unequitable and unconscientious bargains”.177 And, although 
it was not the first time that courts had refused the enforcement of 
unfair contracts,178 it was certainly one of the first times the refusal was 
rationalized in conscience-oriented terms. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s 
words, which emphasize the potential conflict between contractual rights 
and conscience, have proven to be appealing to generations of judges 
170. Klinck, “Nebulous”, supra note 3 at 211.
171. Earl of Oxford, supra note 84 at 7.
172. See e.g. Samet, supra note 26 at 14-17 (reviewing criticisms against 
anchoring equity in conscience).
173. Klinck, Conscience, supra note 25 at 11.
174. Ibid.
175. Mason, supra note 27 at 1.
176. Earl of Chesterfield, supra note 4 at 155.
177. Ibid.
178. For the “ancient roots” of unconscionability, see e.g. Friedman, supra note 
6 at 334-43.
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and legal commentators on both sides of the pond.179 For centuries 
those words have been cited numerous times,180 thus spreading a logic 
born in the “courts of conscience” to all modern courts, regardless of 
their operation under equity or law.181 As the reason for unenforceability 
came to be known as “unconscionability”, alluding to Hardwicke LC’s 
“unconscientious bargains”, it retained conscience and morality as the 
logic that explains the refusal to enforce the contract. It can be contended, 
therefore, without much risk, that equitable limitations on the freedom 
of contract reflect a moral-based rationality.
More specifically, equity’s rationality defines as unconscientious 
the exploitation of the structure of the law, or the letter of the law, 
by opportunists. Accordingly, the role of equity is understood as 
discouraging opportunism, forbidding the abuse of legal rights,182 and 
preventing a “behavior that is technically legal but is done with a view of 
securing unintended benefits from the system”.183 Put another way, and 
following Aristotle’s account of equity, it is the role of equity to constrain 
the way people exercise their legal rights, and for that purpose motives 
matter. Thus, a person can be a stickler and formalistically insist on fully 
exhausting his or her legal rights, but he or she is not permitted to be a 
stickler “in a bad way”. Or, in other words, a person is not permitted to 
exercise his or her legal rights outside of the purposes for which they were 
created and in a manner that harms others. In that sense, the logic of 
179. The first American case to refer to the words of Hardwicke LC in Earl of 
Chesterfield, supra note 4 is Powell, supra note 7. The Supreme Court has 
adopted the full definition in Hume, supra note 7.
180. To date the latest case citing the definition in full (including the archaic 
term “unconscientious bargains” as opposed to only referring to Earl 
of Chesterfield, supra note 4) is Brown, supra note 7 at 678-80, vacated 
Marmet, supra note 7.
181. See the decision of the US Supreme court in Hume, supra note 7, citing 
Hardwicke LC’s definition, and other cases that had followed it, and 
affirming the lower court’s finding (“[t]hese citations are sufficient to show 
that in suits upon unconscionable agreements the courts of law will take 
the matter in their own control, and will, without the intervention of 
courts of equity, protect the parties against their enforcement” at 411). 
182. Klimchuk, “Equity”, supra note 29 at 257-58.
183. Smith, supra note 28 at 233.
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equity is moral as it fits Kant’s view that it is immoral to treat people as 
mere means rather than as ends in and of themselves.184
Applying equity rationality instead of neoliberal rationality to the 
lengthy and complex contracts drafted by corporations will therefore 
yield the opposite result than the one achieved under the new arbitration 
jurisprudence. To be sure, the right to the legal enforcement of contracts 
according to their terms is a salient aspect of the freedom of contract 
and, under the FAA, this right includes the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. However, to seek the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
that were intentionally designed to deprive the other party of access to 
any measure of legal help necessarily makes a party a stickler in a bad 
way and acting opportunistically in exploitation of the general law of 
enforceability. It is an abuse of the legal tool of contract and the legal 
rights that are aimed at securing this tool. To be clear, the main problem 
with the new arbitration jurisprudence is not with affirming the effort 
of stronger market players to cast the scope of their freedom of contract 
too widely. Rather, the wrong is in denying that those contractual rights 
must be exercised with a conscience, in the service of allowing rather than 
preventing dispute resolution.185 While equity’s logic would condemn 
such opportunistic behavior, the neoliberal rationality confirms and 
incentivizes it.
D. Law without Equity
In the context of the Anglo-American legal world, with its centuries-
long tradition of equity, legal adherence to neoliberal rationality 
effectively means divorcing law from equity principles. The result, which 
I term “law without equity”, presents severe risks to the legitimacy of law 
and to the future of the social contract holding subjects together. Law 
without equity allows — and even incentivizes — humans who have 
184. Robert Johnson, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004), 
online: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive <http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/kant-moral/>.
185. Compare to the analysis of Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett, [1936] 2 
KB 468 (CA (Eng)) in Klimchuk, “Equity”, supra note 29 at 259.
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accumulated enough power to act opportunistically. Without equity’s 
restraining power, those with a combination of economic means, political 
influence, and intellectual sophistication can and will exploit the legal 
rules of private ordering to gain even more power and influence. 
As the case of class arbitration waivers demonstrates, private entities 
increasingly use legal rules — such as rules pertaining to the enforceability 
of contracts — to “delete legal remedies” for others in order “to enhance 
their economic position”.186 While the formal letter of the FAA may 
tolerate an interpretation that requires an enforcement of any arbitration 
agreement,187 including one that is effectively designed to prevent 
arbitration, allowing an opportunistic exploitation of this possibility, 
and of the formality and generality of the law, is harmful not only to 
the weaker parties it directly leaves without redress. At a deeper level, 
a second-order harm occurs: the entire neoliberal legal regime which 
enforces contracts without equitable limitations increasingly conflicts 
with key principles of the rule of law. 
Notably, in the context of private law in general and contract law 
in particular, most of the threat to the rule of law comes from powerful 
market actors and from the failure of the law to limit them. This, 
however, should not stop us from recognizing the big-picture problem. 
Although the rule of law has traditionally been a public law doctrine, 
there is a growing recognition of the importance of linking it to the way 
private law treats the exercise of private powers, especially in times of 
186. Margaret Jane Radin, “Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?” in 
Austin & Klimchuk, Private Law, supra note 28 at 297 [Radin, “A 
Threat”].
187. But note that many have argued that this was never the intention of 
the legislator. See e.g. Hiro N Aragaki, “The Federal Arbitration Act as 
Procedural Reform” (2014) 89:6 New York University Law Review 1939 
(contesting the contractual model of arbitration and arguing that “the 
FAA was understood by merchants, judges, and lawyers as a vehicle for 
improving the procedure by which commercial disputes were adjudicated 
fair and square” at 1943).
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increasing privatization.188 In other words, the rule of law pertains not 
only to the relationship between individuals and the state, but also to the 
interactions between individuals. On this view, then, when legal actors 
decide questions of private law they heavily influence the rule of law.189 
Or, as Radin has compellingly argued in the context of contracts:
[f ]irms that use contract to destroy the underlying basis of contract, that deploy 
contract against itself, are using contract to destroy the ideal of contractual 
ordering, which the rule of law is formulated to protect. In this way, they 
not only undermine the idea of a regime of private ordering, they effectively 
undermine the rule of law.190
1. Arbitrariness
A core element of the rule of law is that “a right to exercise power arbitrarily 
cannot be conferred or upheld by law”.191 And yet, the new arbitration 
jurisprudence does exactly that. By offering unconstrained enforceability 
services, this jurisprudence awards the strongest market players an ability 
to exercise their own power over those who need to contract with them. 
Accordingly, the new arbitration jurisprudence facilitates the subjection 
of large portions of the public — workers, consumers, clients and the 
like — “to the arbitrary will of others”.192
The will of powerful market players is arbitrary not because it is 
random or capricious; it is in fact quite systematic and deliberate in its 
uncompromising demand for waivers of rights and remedies. Rather, it 
is arbitrary in the sense that the power conferred by law — to design and 
enforce arbitration contracts — is being abused. The drafters of contracts 
use their legal power not as a way to shape a private mechanism of dispute 
resolution as authorized by the FAA. Quite to the contrary, these drafters 
deploy their power(s) arbitrarily to grant themselves immunity from legal 
188. Lisa M Austin and Dennis Klimchuk, “Introduction” in Austin & 
Klimchuk, Private Law, supra note 28 at 6-14 [Austin & Klimchuck, 
“Introduction”].
189. William Lucy, “The Rule of Law and Private Law, in Private Law and the 
Rule of Law” in Austin & Klimchuk, Private Law, supra note 28 at 41.
190. Radin, “A Threat”, supra note 186 at 301 [emphasis added].
191. Austin & Klimchuk, “Introduction”, supra note 188 at 1.
192. Klimchuk, “Equity”, supra note 29 at 249.
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claims. Such an exercise of power “undermines the legal infrastructure of 
private ordering, and becomes a scheme of arbitrary power”.193
2. Inequality
Another core principle of the rule of law is equality before the law. 
Under this principle, Dicey famously explained, “every man, whatever 
be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals”.194 However, the 
neoliberal celebration of the freedom of contract — in a biased form 
— allows one group of powerful market actors to use their freedom 
in a manner that positions their group above the law, exempt from the 
“jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals”.195 At the same time, by enforcing 
the contracts drafted by this preferred group, the new arbitration 
jurisprudence deprives most other members of the public from having 
access to a working mechanism of dispute resolution, thereby marking 
their inferiority before the law. Put differently, when — with approval 
from the law — some can put themselves above the law while others 
remain with no “reasonable access to remedies”,196 the principle of 
equality before the law is severely corroded.
3. Risking the Social Contract
Where does law without equity — which conflicts with core elements 
of the rule of law — leave us as a society? Not in a very hopeful place. 
When the freedom of contract has a biased definition and is subject to 
almost no limitation even in circumstances when it is clearly abused, 
the legitimacy of the law is at risk and the trustworthiness of courts is 
jeopardized. Recall that Pound had warned us about this risk back at 
the midst of the Lochner era, reporting that the then-new “liberty of 
contract” approach had generated “a growing distrust of the integrity of 
193. Radin, “A Threat”, supra note 186 at 300.
194. Austin & Klimchuk, “Introduction”, supra note 188 at 4-5 citing AV 
Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10d 
(London: Macmillan, 1959) at 193.
195. Ibid.
196. Radin, “A Threat”, supra note 186 at 290.
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the courts”.197 About a century later, a Montana judge responded to the 
pro-arbitration jurisprudence of his time with similar suspicions, albeit 
less carefully expressed, writing: “[i]t seems to me that judges who have 
let their concern for their own crowded docket overcome their concern for 
the rights they are entrusted with should step aside and let someone else 
assume their burdens”.198
And by risking the legitimacy of the law, the very fabric of our social 
contract is at risk. The belief that we all should sacrifice some of our 
individual freedoms for the sake of maintaining a safe and just civil society 
is severely undermined when the law so clearly works on behalf of a certain 
group affiliated with the economic elite. Instead of subjecting themselves 
to the rule of law — and in return, to being protected by the law — mass 
parts of the public are controlled by the unbridled interests of the elite 
as those elite interests are enforced by law. It does not help, of course, 
that in addition to the emergence of the new arbitration jurisprudence, 
other recent decisions of the American Supreme Court conferred upon 
corporations key political and constitutional rights traditionally reserved 
to individuals.199 The problem is that the more the law aligns itself 
with neoliberal rationality and the interests of corporations, the more 
it becomes part of the general “shift from the social contract to savage 
forms of corporate sovereignty”.200
Indeed, our current situation may be even worse since the said 
“shift” sometimes seems to amount, as suggested by Wendy Brown, to 
a complete “inversion” of the social contract.201 Instead of being equally 
limited and protected by the state, subjects are divided into winners and 
losers, and losers are treated as means rather than ends. As proved by 
the new arbitration jurisprudence, the end is no longer the wellbeing of 
individuals, but rather economic efficiency, which is defined from the 
197. Pound, supra note 32 at 487.
198. Casarotto v Lombardi, 268 Mont 369 at 386 (Sup Ct 1994). 
199. Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310 (2010) [Citizens United]; Burwell v 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 134 S Ct 2751 (US 2014). 
200. Henry A Giroux, Neoliberalism’s War on Higher Education (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2014) at 54.
201. Brown, supra note 20 at 38, 64, 110, 134, 213.
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perspective of the winners. To achieve the desired efficiency, those at the 
bottom are knowingly and deliberately left unprotected. And, rather 
than offering them safety via the law, the state demands that they will 
either protect themselves by not signing exploitative contracts or sacrifice 
themselves on behalf of the preservation of an efficient economy.
V. Conclusion
In his highly influential book Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as 
Administrated in England and America, Judge Story wrote:
[t]here may be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a bargain, as to 
demonstrate some gross imposition or some undue influence; and in such 
cases Courts of Equity ought to interfere ... such unconscionableness, or such 
inadequacy should be made out, as would (to use an expressive phrase) shock 
the conscience.202
Although written in 1836, Story J’s words have gained much eminence 
throughout the years and have been quoted, with or without adequate 
reference to him, by numerous judges and scholars.203 Notably, Story J’s 
message has two separate prongs, both still relevant today. One relates to 
people’s behavior and highlights that an unlimited freedom of contract 
may create bargains that are so unfair and immoral that they “shock the 
conscience”. The other relates to the role of the judiciary and insists that 
when asked to enforce such unconscionable contracts, courts “ought to 
interfere”.
Comparatively, outside of the American legal world, recent works 
have described and analyzed a rising agreement with Story J’s influential 
ideas. For example, Irit Samet has argued that “[o]ne of the most 
interesting and controversial developments in the recent jurisprudence on 
202. Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered 
in England and America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1866) at 268 
[emphasis added].
203. Since Story J’s words were quoted in full in the known case of Eyre v 
Potter, 56 US 42 (1853), some have attributed them to the US Supreme 
Court: see e.g. Friedman, supra note 6 (“[t]he ‘unconscionableness or 
inadequacy’ must be such as would ‘shock the conscience’ – an ‘expressive 
phrase’ that retains a hold on the current unconscionability doctrine” at 
339, and ibid at 60).
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equity is the increasing use of conscience categories to discourage overly 
selfish behaviour among parties to commercial relationships”.204 In the 
United States, however, the Supreme Court has recently developed — as 
this article has sought to demonstrate — an approach to agreements that 
directly conflicts with each of the prongs of Story J’s theory. 
First, the Court has adopted an unfettered version of the freedom 
of contract that allows and encourages drafters of contracts to behave 
selfishly, while classifying conscience-related problems inapplicable, 
or “unrelated”. And second, the Court has strongly disagreed with the 
notion that courts “ought to interfere” in cases of unconscionability. 
To the contrary, according to the new arbitration jurisprudence courts 
“must” do the opposite: they “must rigorously enforce arbitration 
agreements”.205 Accordingly, courts are no longer allowed to “interfere” 
by using equitable tools such as the unconscionability doctrine. 
Again, it is urgent to recognize that this new approach, which this 
article refers to as neoliberal-Lochnerism, creates a second rise of the 
freedom of contract that operates not only in the domain of arbitration. 
Rather, all the rights of weaker parties — whether produced by regulations 
or by contractual terms — are rendered meaningless when stronger parties 
are permitted to use their freedom in a manner that obstructs access to 
remedies. The genus of arbitration agreements now allowed by the US 
Supreme Court thus represents a larger assault on fairness, morality, and 
justice than the eye can see at first glance.
The result, I have argued, is “law without equity” and it presents 
severe risks to the legitimacy of law and to the future of the social contract 
that necessarily holds subjects together. Law without equity allows — and 
even incentivizes — humans who have accumulated enough power to act 
opportunistically. Without equity’s restraining power, those possessing 
a combination of economic means, political influence, and intellectual 
sophistication can and will exploit the legal rules of private ordering in 
order to gain even more power and influence.
But is there any potential to counter the rising and spreading neoliberal 
204. Samet, supra note 26 at 13.
205. American Express, supra note 14 at 2309. 
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rationality? The task is extremely difficult, especially given the growing 
powers of corporations not only in the market, but also in the political 
arena.206 Indeed, despite strong evidence and a dramatic study produced 
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,207 there is currently little 
to no hope that efforts to overcome the new arbitration jurisprudence 
by revising the FAA will be successful.208 However, as any other quest 
for hope,209 the ability to imagine things differently is key. Restoring 
old images of equity seems to be a good starting point for envisioning a 
better justice system. Courts must be allowed to see themselves — and 
act as — “courts of conscience”; they cannot be ordered to participate in 
exploitation conspiracies. Being moral actors themselves, judges simply 
“have no business coming to the aid of immoral business practices”.210 
And, despite the argument that no one knows precisely what “conscience” 
meant centuries ago,211 or how its meaning is supposed to be applied in 
our days,212 there must be a way to know what conscience is not. 
Judges ordered by the Supreme Court to hold against their 
conscience and to approve manipulations of the law disguised as exercises 
of the freedom of contract are not only at risk of personal frustration. 
Given the expressive power of the law judges serve a social role of moral 
leaders and thus their role in limiting freedom by conscience is of utmost 
206. Brown, supra note 20 at 152-73 (offering a critical analysis of Citizens 
United, supra note 199). 
207. US, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report 
to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act § 1028(a), (2015) online: <http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf>.
208. Glover, “Disappearing Claims”, supra note 16 (explaining why “amending 
the FAA is an extremely difficult political task” at 3086).
209. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, “Law in the Cultivation of Hope” (2007) 
95:2 California Law Review 319. 
210. Robin L West, “The Anti-Empathic Turn”, in James E Fleming, ed, 
Passions & Emotions (New York: NYU Press, 2013) 243 at 265.
211. See e.g. Richard Hedlund, “The Theological Foundations of Equity’s 
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importance.213 For courts to effectively fulfill this leadership role we 
ought to conceive conscience as “a metaphor for the dynamic interaction 
between changing social norms and shifting individual beliefs”,214 and 
not as an arbitrary measure comparable to the Chancellor’s Food. On this 
view, courts are a crucial mediator between society and the self. Armed 
with equity principles, and especially the unconscionability doctrine, they 
have the power — and the duty — to restrain the freedom of contract, 
restore contractual justice, and protect the integrity of the law.
213. Keren, “Guilt-Free Markets”, supra note 30.
214. Ibid.
